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LET THE BUYER BE WELL INFORMED?-DOUBTING THE
DEMISE OF CAVEAT EMPTOR
ALAN M. WEINBERGER*
The cruellest lies are often told in silence.'
-Robert Louis Stevenson
INTRODUCTION
Returning home from grocery shopping one evening last spring,
a forty-two-year-old architect was killed in the presence of his wife and
children on the street outside his St. Louis townhouse by a gunshot to
the neck during an attempted carjacking.2 By the next morning, po-
lice had arrested and obtained a confession from a recently released
parolee wearing an electronic ankle bracelet.3 Several homes in the
neighborhood, previously considered to be generally free of serious
crime, were listed for sale at the time of this incident. Human experi-
ence teaches that other homes are likely to be offered for sale in the
aftermath of this incident. Private morality and conscience will in-
form each seller's decision whether to volunteer information about
this notorious crime to potential purchasers from outside the commu-
nity, or to respond expansively if asked about security. Some of these
sellers may also seek the advice of counsel.
Advising real property vendors whether to disclose unfavorable
information to potential purchasers was easy for our ancestors in the
profession.' Under Anglo-Saxon common law imported into the
United States, sellers of real property were indeed the chosen people.
* Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law. A.B., J.D., University of
Michigan. This Article was written while visiting at the Hebrew University ofJerusalem. I
am very grateful for the considerable academic and administrative support extended to me
during my time there.
1. ROBERT L. STEVENSON, VIRGINIBUS PUERISQUE AND OTHER PAPERS 72 (New York,
Charles Scribner & Sons 1907) (1881).
2. Michael D. Sorkin, Horror Greets Family After Quit Night Out, ST. Louis Posr-Dis-
PATCH, Mar. 25, 1995, at 1.
3. Id.
4. See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 577
(1988) ("Sell that house with the leak in the basement? Lucky you, you can unload the
place without having to tell the buyer about such things at all."); Alan M. Weinberger,
Expanding the Fiduciary Relationship Bestiary: Does Concurrent Ownership Satisf the Family Resem-
blance Test?, 24 SETON HALL L. RExV. 1767, 1793 (1994) ("Silence may not be golden, but at
least it did not constitute actionable fraud.").
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The doctrine of caveat emptor5 effectively protected vendors against
any continuing liability after closing. After delivering the deed of con-
veyance and relinquishing possession, sellers could sleep well at night,
secure in the knowledge that they could not be exposed to legal liabil-
ity, even by reason of express representations in the contract of sale.6
Such was the state of real property law well into the 1960s.
Erosion of the doctrine of caveat emptor has changed everything.
Not only has the legal table been turned on sellers of real property in
recent years, even their own agents are now turning against them as
judicial decisions within the past decade have imposed a duty on real
estate agents to disclose information to purchasers.7 Confronted with
expanded exposure to legal liability, the real estate brokerage industry
has opted for self-protection. Nationwide, brokers are sponsoring leg-
islation to shift the burden of information disclosure to their princi-
pals,8 and their lobbying efforts thus far have succeeded in enacting
disclosure statutes in approximately half of the states.9 As a result,
what was once a routine legal matter has become a client-counseling
minefield. While blanket disclosure of faults and defects may avoid
subsequent litigation (including the possibility of punitive dam-
ages), 10 unnecessary disclosure of negative information may place the
seller at a competitive disadvantage, perhaps to the point ofjeopardiz-
ing the transaction."1 Conscientious practitioners can provide no bet-
ter test for what requires disclosure than the Golden Rule: Would the
5. The Latin maxim provided in its entirety: "Caveat emptor, qui ignorare non debuit
quodjus alienum emit." ("Let a purchaser, who ought not be ignorant of the amount and
nature of the interest which he is about to buy, exercise proper caution."). HERBERT
BROOME, A SELECrION OF LEGAL MAXIMS 528 (10th ed. 1939), cited in Dawn K McGee,
Note, Potential Liability for Misrepresentations in Residential Real Estate Transactions: Let the
Broker Beware, 16 FoRDHAM URB. LJ. 127, 129 n.8 (1988).
6. Indeed, most sellers would not have considered legal representation necessary in
residential transactions involving real estate brokers strictly bound by fiduciary duty to act
in their best interest. Real property sellers had but one concern-collecting a check at
closing for the difference between the contract price and the earnest money down pay-
ment delivered by purchaser at the time of contract formation.
7. See infta notes 211-214 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 187-220 and accompanying text.
9. See infta note 187. Additionally, even the federal government has found it neces-
sary to regulate the field. Beginning October 28, 1995, no contract for the sale of a home
built before 1978 is enforceable unless the seller provides purchaser a copy of a lead haz-
ard information pamphlet prepared by the Environmental Protection Agency, and a form
disclosing any known presence of lead-based paint. Residential Lead-Based Paint Hazard
Reduction Act of 1992 §§ 1002-1061, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4851-4856 (1995).
10. See generally M. David LeBrun, Annotation, Recovery of Punitive Damages in Action by
Purchasers of Real Property Charging Fraud or Misrepresentation, 19 ALR.4RTH 801 (1983).
11. Steven W. Koslovsky, To Disclose or Not to Disclose: An Overview of Fraudulent Nondisclo-
sure, 50J. Mo. B. 161, 161 (1994).
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seller want the information if he were a potential purchaser of the
property? 2 Unfortunately, the quality of the advice clients are likely
to receive from an attorney will recall to mind the familiar (if not
particularly instructive) childhood nursery rhyme:
Engine, engine Number 9
Going down Chicago line.
If the train goes off the track,
Will I get my money back?
Yes.. ., no .... maybe so,
All the way to Mexico. 3
This Article explores one of the most extraordinary legal reforms
of the past generation: 4 the nationwide erosion of the common-law
doctrine of caveat emptor in transactions in real property. 15 Caveat
emptor is a time-honored principle of both Anglo-Saxon and Roman
legal traditions,' 6 and is firmly entrenched in the common-law history
of this country.17 Its continued vitality is largely limited to commercial
real estate transactions,' 8 although deterioration has occurred in that
field.9 Part I of this Article explores the origins and causes of the
decline of the doctrine of caveat emptor, and provides a brief compar-
ative analysis of its status in other legal systems. Part II analyzes the
contemporary common-law doctrine imposing a duty on vendors to
12. Alan Silverstein, -Mandatory Seller Disclosure Finally Introduced to Ontario, TORONTO
STAR, Mar. 19, 1994, at F26.
13. The author is indebted to Professor Kent Syverud of the University of Michigan
Law School for reciting this rhyme in another context during a presentation delivered at
the annual meeting of the Association of American Law Schools in January 1995.
14. An influential commentator has identified the erosion of caveat emptor as illustrat-
ing a pattern ofjudicial substitution of fuzzy ambiguity for well-defined rules of decision to
the point that litigants no longer have a clear sense of their legal rights and obligations.
Rose, supra note 4, at 580-82.
15. With respect to transactions in personal property, the doctrine of caveat emptor
began to unravel by the early part of this century. Today every state except Louisiana has
replaced the doctrine of caveat emptor in personal property transactions with the Uniform
Commercial Code's provisions covering implied warranty, good faith, and fair dealing.
U.C.C. §§ 1-203, 2-314, 2-315 (1995).
16. See infra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
17. "No principle of the common law has been better established, or more often af-
firmed, both in this country and in England, than ... the maxim of caveat emptor ....
Barnard v. Kellogg, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 383, 388 (1870).
18. In addition to the application of the doctrine to commercial real estate sales, caveat
emptor appears to survive in some residential transactions. See, e.g., Bultemeier v. Ridgway,
834 S.W.2d 896, 897 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that caveat emptor applied to sheriffs'
execution sale). But compare Hill v. Thompson, 564 So. 2d 1, 11 (Miss. 1989) (holding that
caveat emptor applied to foreclosure sale) with Gibb v. Citicorp Mortgage, Inc., 518
N.W.2d 910, 918 (Neb. 1994) (holding that "as is" clause in foreclosure sale is relevant but
not controlling).
19. See infra note 181 and accompanying text.
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disclose latent defects that adversely affect the value of real property
offered for sale in the marketplace. Finally, in Part III, the Article
considers the paradoxical impact of state mandatory disclosure stat-
utes on the doctrine, arguing that their enactment has arrested the
erosion process. As the unintended beneficiaries and economic inef-
ficiencies of disclosure statutes become apparent, the flight from ca-
veat emptor may be reversed.
I. ORIGINS OF CAVEAT EMPTOR AND CAUSES OF ITS DECLINE
"Caveat emptor" is shorthand for a rubric of affirmative legal de-
fenses formerly available to sellers of real property to effectively thwart
claims by disappointed purchasers. Among these defenses were the
statute of frauds,2" the parol evidence rule,21 and the doctrine of
merger by deed.22 In its essence, the doctrine of caveat emptor pro-
vided that sellers of real property, dealing at arm's length with pro-
spective purchasers, owed no duty to disclose unfavorable information
about the property. Vendors, therefore, incurred no legal liability by
withholding their knowledge of defective conditions.2" The law re-
quired buyers to fend for themselves by exercising a healthy modicum
of skepticism as to a property's value and quality.24 In a very real
sense, purchasers were expected to govern themselves by the philoso-
phy that every acquisition of real property represented a gamble.2"
Caveat emptor reflected two underlying assumptions. First, sell-
ers and purchasers occupied equal bargaining positions and shared
an equal opportunity to inspect the quality of property and discover
defective conditions before the transfer of tide.26 Second, manufac-
20. The statute of frauds requires that a contract for the sale of an interest in land be in
writing. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 110 (1981).
21. The parol evidence rule makes oral statements inadmissible to contradict the terms
of a written contract. U.C.C. § 2-202 (1995).
22. The doctrine of merger by deed states that any assurances, representations, or war-
ranties by a seller do not survive the contract phase unless specifically listed in the deed.
ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 11.13, at 862 (2d ed. 1993).
23. See, e.g., Peek v. Gurney, 6 L.R.-E. & I. App. 377, 403 (H.L. 1873) ("Mere non-
disclosure of material facts, however morally censurable ... would in my opinion form no
ground for an action in the nature of an action for misrepresentation.").
24. As one commentator explained: "The purchaser was deemed perfectly capable of
inspecting the property and deciding for himself whether he wanted it, and if anyone were
foolish enough to buy a pig in a poke, he deserved what he got. Short of outright fraud
that would mislead the buyer, the seller had no duties to disclose anything at all." Rose,
supra note 4, at 580-81.
25. Walter H. Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 YALE LJ. 1133, 1187
(1931).
26. See WARREN G. MAGNUSON &JEAN CARPER, THE DARK SIDE OF THE MARKETPLACE at x
(1968).
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turers and sellers of tangible property were not in the business of sup-
plying information, and any information furnished to purchasers was
merely incidental to the actual product. The omission or falsity of this
information, as the argument went, ought not form the basis for legal
liability.27 Although these assumptions may once have been quite re-
alistic, each has now been rejected as inconsistent with modern no-
tions of justice, fair dealing, and sound public policy.
A. Origins of the Doctrine of Caveat Emptor
Protection of purchasers against shoddy or defective goods was
not part of the tradition of the legal systems that would later influence
our own.2 8 Although its source is often traced to sixteenth century
English decisions involving the sale of chattels,29 the doctrine of ca-
veat emptor originated much earlier in primitive Roman law.3"
As originally applied to the transfer of real property, the doctrine
of caveat emptor evolved in agrarian societies where unimproved land
27. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
28. The principle of caveat emptor in the sale of real property is also found in early
Jewish law. Transactions in land were excluded from the legal prohibition against over-
reaching. MENACHEM ELON, THE PRINCIPLES OF JEWISH LAw 216 (1975) ("[T]he scholars
called land something that is always worth the money paid for it."). Caveat emptor is not
found in Islamic law. SUSAN E. RAYNER, THE THEORY OF CONTRACTS IN ISLAMIC LAW 144
(1994). Under that system, a buyer of land who discovers defects upon transfer of posses-
sion may choose to annul the contract. Id. at 327-29.
29. See, e.g., Hamilton, supra note 25, at 1156-64. The phrase itself first appeared in a
text containing advice on horse trading published in 1534. Id. at 1164; KEVIN M. TEEVEN, A
HISTORY OF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT 136 (1990) ("[I]f he be tame
and have been rydden upon, then caveat emptor." (citation omitted)). Its earliest appear-
ance in the common-law courts may have been in reaction to an upsurge in itinerant
merchants. The doctrine alerted buyers of the likelihood that their sellers would not be
available to respond to customer complaints.
30. A. Rogerson, Implied Warranty Against Latent Defects in Roman and English Law, in
STUDIES IN THE RoMAN LAW OF SALE 112, 113 (David Daube ed., 1959); WILLIAM L. BUR-
DICK, PRINCIPLES OF RoMAN LAW 445 (1938).
Under an exception to the Roman doctrine of caveat emptor introduced in the fourth
century B.C., dealers were required to disclose faults and defects in slaves, as well as cattle,
horses, and other drought animals offered for sale in the public marketplace unless the
flaws were either so obvious that an ordinary buyer would notice them, or not sufficiently
serious as to interfere with the working condition or general usefulness of the slave or
animal. JAMES MACKINTOSH, THE RoMAN LAW OF SALE 278-79 (2d ed. 1907). This limited
exception was justified by the general rascality of dealers in slaves and animals, who tended
to be foreigners with a faculty for rapid disappearance. Id. at 279. By the time of Cicero,
however, Roman civil law developed to the point where principles of good faith required
sellers of land to disclose faults known to them. Id. at 279-80. Failure to disclose defective
conditions was equated with affirmative misrepresentation. Id. But see Leon Rittenberg III,
Comment, Louisiana's Tenfold Approach to the Duty to Inform, 66 TUL. L. REv. 151, 157 n.22
(1991) ("Scholars debate whether Cicero's view represented the Roman law of the time or,
rather, Cicero's opinion of what it should have been.").
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was the predominant subject matter of real property transactions."
Improvements, if any, were non-complex, and the nature of structural
systems was readily apparent to a prospective purchaser. 2 Buyers
were fully capable of competent independent investigation to satisfy
themselves as to the quality of construction." Therefore, there was
no need to rely upon the transfer of information by sellers regarding
defective conditions or other matters. In these societies, local market-
place trade "was an arm's length proposition with wits matched
against skill."34 Shoppers tended to carefully inspect the look and feel
of commodities offered for sale on the open market, and buyers hag-
gled vigorously with vendors over price.35 In an economy based on
face-to-face dealings, consumers were more likely to feel ashamed of
being outsmarted than angry at having been cheated.3 6 Real property
was exchanged between neighbors in simple face-to-face transactions,
and the parties were generally well-acquainted with one another and
their respective reputations for veracity.3 7 They also were generally
familiar with the condition of property being exchanged, the compe-
tence of its builder, and the quality of its maintenance and
renovation. 8
Therefore, market prices came to be set in accordance with the
principle of caveat emptor. Knowledgeable purchasers of property
without benefit of enforceable warranties of quality made allowance
for the risk that articles might not be sound by bidding prices down.
With prices already discounted to reflect the level of risk being as-
sumed by purchasers, a rule of law imposing liability for nondisclosure
of defects would have given buyers a windfall. 9
The celebrated case of Chandelor v. Lopus4° is often regarded as
the origin of the doctrine of caveat emptor under English common
law.4" In Chandelor, a London goldsmith sold a jewel to a foreign
31. Wilhite v. Mays, 232 S.E.2d 141, 142-43 (Ga. Ct. App. 1976), affd, 235 S.E.2d 532
(Ga. 1977); Holcomb v. Zinke, 365 N.W.2d 507, 511 (N.D. 1985).
32. See Wilhite, 232 S.E.2d at 142-43.
33. See id.
34. Allison Dunham, Vendor's Obligation as to Fitness of Land for a Particular Purpose, 37
MINN. L. REv. 108, 110 (1953).
35. PATRICK S. ATWYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 179 (1979).
36. Id. at 179-80; see also MAGNUSON & CARPER, supra note 26, at x.
37. Dunham, supra note 34, at 110.
38. Id. "Of course caveat emptor would be the rule in such a society." Id.
39. See ATrAH, supra note 35, at 180, 465-66.
40. 79 Eng. Rep. 3, Cro. Jac. 4 (Ex. Ch. 1603).
41. See, e.g., HOWARD 0. HUNTER, MODERN LAW OF CONTRACTS I 9.02[3] (rev. ed.
1993).
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merchant for £100, a substantial sum of money at the time.4 2 The
goldsmith asserted that the jewel was a rare "bezar stone."43 The pur-
chaser, complaining it was not a bezar stone, filed suit for breach of
warranty.' The court denied relief, holding that the goldsmith had
merely affirmed and not warranted the character of the stone.45 The
decision came to be cited for the proposition that English courts were
not interested in enforcing the fairness of an exchange because they
thought contracting parties should handle such matters themselves.46
It seems extraordinary that such a bizarre case would serve as the
foundation stone for the principle of caveat emptor.47 The rather
predictable outcome reflects a sensible judicial reluctance to second-
guess the parties' estimate of such a strange object, whose value was
clearly subjective.48 Nevertheless, by the early seventeenth century the
doctrine of caveat emptor was being applied in England to convey-
ances in real, as well as personal property.49 Imported as part of Eng-
lish common law, the doctrine of caveat emptor had become a central
governing principle of land conveyancing law in the United States by
the nineteenth century.50
In its formative period, the doctrine of caveat emptor also served
a gate-keeping function, given that claims by disappointed purchasers
might have otherwise overburdened the judicial system at the very
time law courts were beginning to emerge as an effective organ for
42. Chandelor, 79 Eng. Rep. at 3-4.
43. Id. at 4. A bezar, or bezoar, stone, similar to a gallstone, is formed in the stomach
or intestines of goats and was once believed to have antidotal or medicinal power. ATWAH,
supra note 35, at 179; A.W.B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF CorNTRAcr 536
(1975).
44. ATYA, supra note 35, at 178.
45. Chandelor, 79 Eng. Rep. at 4.
46. ATIVA-, supra note 35, at 178-79.
47. Indeed, the lineage of the doctrine of caveat emptor in the United States has been
traced directly to Chandelor v. Lopus. MORTONJ. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERI-
CAN LAW 180 & nn.109-10 (1977).
48. See ATnYAH, supra note 35, at 179 ("In all probability the plaintiff was complaining
not that it was not a 'bezoar stone' but that it did not have the magical qualities he had
expected.").
49. See COKE UPON LrrTLETON 102a, cited in Hamilton, supra note 25, at 1165 ("Note,
that by the civil law every man is bound to warrant the thing that he selleth and conveyeth,
albeit there be no express warranty; either in deed or in law; but the common law bindeth
him not, for caveat emptor.").
50. In Barnard v. Kellogg, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 383, 388-89 (1870), Supreme CourtJus-
tice Davis wrote, "Of such universal acceptance is the doctrine of caveat emptor in this coun-
try, that the courts of all the States in the Union where the common law prevails, with one
exception (South Carolina), sanction it." Indeed, caveat emptor came to be applied even
more vigorously in the United States than in England. ATwAH, supra note 35, at 180.
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dispute resolution.5" With the passage from an agrarian to an indus-
trial society, caveat emptor was nourished by the norms of noninter-
vention and rugged individualism reflected in nineteenth century
marketplace morality.52 Persons entering into contractual relation-
ships were not to expect the law "to stand in loco parentis to protect
them" if they made a bad bargain by not exercising ordinary business
sense. Contracting parties had the responsibility to either rely on
their own judgment or require express warranties if they doubted
their judgment.54 A rule of law leveling out informational advantages
in transactions conducted in a free marketplace would have been seen
as depriving the diligent of the fruits of lawfully acquired superior skill
and knowledge.55
Laissez faire political economists of the period regarded caveat
emptor as a simple, efficient, and self-executing mechanism to pre-
vent the manufacture and sale of defective commodities without inter-
ference from vast systems of governmental regulation.56  The
occasional injustice that inevitably resulted from refusing judicial re-
lief to a buyer too careless or foolish to inspect before purchasing
thereby educated the general populace. Isolated cases of individual
hardship could be expected to decrease in frequency as buyers be-
came familiar with standard operating procedures of the marketplace.
B. Causes of the Decline of Caveat Emptor
With the benefit of hindsight, it is possible to identify with speci-
ficity and confidence the societal conditions that fostered erosion of
the doctrine of caveat emptor in the law of real property sales during
51. 2 A.PHONSE M. SQUILLANTE &JOHN R. FONSECA, WILLISrON ON SALES § 15-12, at 364
(4th ed. 1974).
52. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 540 (2d ed. 1985) ("The
maxim caveat emptor flattered the manhood and pride of the judges.").
53. Ollerman v. O'Rourke Co., 288 N.W.2d 95, 101 (Wis. 1980).
54. See, e.g., M'Farland v. Newman, 9 Watts 55, 57 (Pa. 1839) ("He who is so simple as
to contract without a specification of the terms, is not a fit subject of judicial
guardianship.").
55. Ollerman, 288 N.W.2d at 101.
56. ATiWAH, supra note 35, at 465. This author also notes that:
If the responsibility for ensuring that a man acquired a reasonable purchase at a
fair price were thrown upon the purchaser, they argued, then the purchaser
would assuredly take the trouble to examine what he was buying with due care.
Shoddy goods would disappear from the market, or if buyers in fact were willing
to buy them at prices reflecting their poor quality, then the goods would find a
market at that price and deservedly so. All this would follow from throwing the
responsibility upon the purchaser, without any legislation or litigation.
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the second half of this century.57 American courts almost universally
adhered to the doctrine of caveat emptor until the middle of the
twentieth century. 8 In the era following World War II, however, the
doctrine began to unravel.59 The post-World War II era was character-
ized by poorer quality homes due to accelerated construction sched-
ules, and a rapidly growing middle class that tended to move more
often.6" As the inability of the average American homebuyer to make a
proper structural inspection became evident, courts began to carve
out exceptions to the doctrine of caveat emptor in highly sympathetic
fact situations.61 This doctrinal breakdown was heralded by English
decisions a decade earlier involving the sale of newly constructed
57. Notwithstanding that it had ceased to affect personal property transactions, the
doctrine of caveat emptor was the staple fare of the law of real estate sales well into the
1960s. See Rose, supra note 4, at 580; Frona M. Powell & Jane P. Mallor, The Case for an
Implied Warranty of Quality in Sales of Commercial Real Estate, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 305, 307
(1990); MILTON FRIEDMAN, CONTRACTS AND CONIEYANCES OF REAL PROPER-Y § 1.2(n), at 42-
43 (5th ed. 1991).
58. See Strawn v. Canuso, 657 A.2d 420, 425 (N.J. 1995) (reviewing the history of caveat
emptor and the historical lack of protection afforded purchasers of real property);
Cochran v. Keeton, 252 So. 2d 307, 311 (Ala. Civ. App. 1970) (discussing how courts have
adapted the role of caveat emptor in Alabama law), affd, 252 So. 2d 313 (Ala. 1971); Linda
M. Libertucci, Builder's Liability to New and Subsequent Purchasers, 20 Sw. U. L. REv. 219, 220
(1991) (providing a historical overview of the development of the doctrine of caveat
emptor).
59. Of course, the process took longer in some jurisdictions than in others. Compare,
e.g., Fegeas v. Sherrill, 147 A.2d 223, 227 (Md. 1958) (noting although "the particular case
here stated by the plaintiff possesses a certain appeal to the moral sense" it does not justify
"imposing upon the frailties of human nature a standard so idealistic" as to require disclo-
sure of active termite infestation by home seller) with Obde v. Schlemeyer, 353 P.2d 672,
674-75 (Wash. 1960) (holding that failure by seller to disclose knowledge of termite infesta-
tion constituted fraud).
60. See McDonald v. Mianecki, 398 A.2d 1283, 1287 (N.J. 1979) (noting that pressure to
abandon or modify caveat emptor increased with the post World-War II mass production of
homes and the resulting change in home-buying practices); Richard C. Webb, Liability for
Construction Defects in Residential Realty: A Re-Examination in Light of Kennedy v. Columbia
Manufacturing Co., 42 S.C. L. Rxv. 503, 504 (1991) (asserting that construction of specula-
tive housing after World War II initially encouraged the application of the doctrine of
caveat emptor, but eventually led to its downfall).
61. For example, in Ollerman v. O'Rourke Co., 288 N.W.2d 95 (Wis. 1980), the buyer
of a vacant building lot claimed that the seller, a corporation engaged in subdivision and
development, failed to disclose the existence of a subsurface well that was uncapped in the
process of excavation. Id. at 97. In order to stop the flow of water and make the subsoil
suitable for building, the buyer incurred expenses that exceeded the cost of the land. Id.
The court held that an unsophisticated buyer, with a reasonable expectation of honesty in
the marketplace, may rely on the skill and knowledge of a vendor in the real estate busi-
ness to disclose material facts not readily discoverable. Id. at 112.
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housing by vendor-builders,6 2 and was influenced by promulgation of
the Uniform Commercial Code.63
Later, the federal courts, together with the rest of society, re-
sponded to the climate of activism created by the civil rights and anti-
war movements of the 1960s. 64 As part of Lyndon Johnson's Great
Society, federally financed legal services attorneys focused judicial at-
tention on the plight of the urban poor.65 The result was the implied
warranty of habitability in residential landlord-tenant law, derived
from jurisprudence by analogy to cases recognizing an implied war-
ranty of suitability in sales by manufacturers of mass-produced chat-
tels.66 Within a generation, and without closely considering the
62. The English courts based their decisions not to apply caveat emptor to the sale of
new homes on two grounds. First, the application of the doctrine would be unjust because
at the time of contract the buyer would be unable to properly inspect a home either under
construction or yet to be constructed; and second, the contract of sale was also considered
to include an implied covenant that the house would be properly constructed. See Perry v.
Sharon Dev. Co., 4 All E.R. 390, 395-96 (C.A. 1937) (holding that the purchaser of a house
under construction is entitled to rely upon the implied warranty of habitability); Miller v.
Cannon Hill Estates, Ltd., [19313 2 K.B. 113, 122-23 (finding in contract for construction
of home both express and implied warranties that house would be fit for habitation).
63. See U.C.C. §§ 1-203, 2-314, 2-315 (1995). Consumers who became accustomed to
the protection of an implied warranty of merchantability in the sale of goods reasonably
expected the law to protect them when they purchased new homes. Joseph C. Brown,Jr.,
Comment, The Implied Warranty of Habitability Doctrine in Residential Property Conveyances: Pol-
icy-Backed Change Proposals, 62 WASH. L. REv. 743, 744 (1987).
64. Edward H. Rabin, The Revolution in Residential Landlord-Tenant Law: Causes and Con-
sequences, 69 CORNELL L. REv. 517, 546-47 (1984). In a remarkably candid exchange of
correspondence, Judge J. Skelly Wright acknowledged that
I was indeed influenced by the fact that, during the nationwide racial turmoil of
the sixties and the unrest caused by the injustice of racially selective service in
Vietnam, most of the tenants in Washington, D.C. slums were poor and black and
most of the landlords were rich and white. There is no doubt in my mind that
these conditions played a subconscious role in influencing my landlord and ten-
ant decisions.
Letter fromJ. Skelly Wright, U.S. Circuit Judge, to Edward H. Rabin (Oct. 14, 1982), in
Rabin, supra, at 549.
65. Rabin, supra note 64, at 550-51.
66. See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1075 (D.C. Cir.) (Wright,
J.) (noting that the decision to extend the implied warranty of habitability reflects a belief
that leases of urban dwelling units should be interpreted and construed like any other
contract), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
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dubious logic, 67 courts imported implied warranty of suitability analy-
sis into the sale of improved real property.68
In the 1980s real estate law was revolutionized by the environ-
mental movement.69 Federal environmental statutes, enforced by a
vigorous Environmental Protection Agency and interpreted by a sym-
pathetic federal judiciary, confronted property owners and their lend-
ers with the spectre of joint and several strict liability for
environmental contamination, unlimited in amount and without re-
gard to traditional concepts of fault.7" At the same time, public atten-
tion became focused on a new and incurable health concern. As part
of the generalized hysteria surrounding Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome (AIDS), prospective home purchasers sought to discover
the circumstances surrounding the reasons for which a property had
come to be placed on the market.7 In this climate, a rule of law con-
doning nondisclosure of environmental contamination and public
health concerns in real property sales became intolerable.72
C. A Comparative Law Analysis
Erosion of the doctrine of caveat emptor in the United States is
further advanced than in most common-law jurisdictions.7 3 Caveat
67. Extending the logic of the U.C.C.'s implied warranty of suitability of purpose from
chattels to the sale of improved real property was unnecessary because the stakes in a real
property transaction are so substantially higher than in the sale of chattels that the buyer of
real property can reasonably be expected to guard his own interests by, for example, order-
ing an engineer's report. Rose, supra note 4, at 582 n.30 (criticizing the decision in Wawak
v. Stewart, 449 S.W.2d 922, 923 (Ark. 1970), in which the court equated the sale of real
property to the sale of a mop and applied the same implied warranty logic to both).
68. See generally Caryn M. Chittenden, From Caveat Emptor to Consumer Equity-The Im-
plied Warranty of Quality Under the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act, 27 WAKE FOREST L.
Rav. 571, 578-83 (1992) (tracing the evolution of consumer protection in real estate from
caveat emptor to implied warranties of quality).
69. This period also featured new home construction on ground previously considered
unsuitable for residential development. Wilhite v. Mays, 232 S.E.2d 141, 143 (Ga. Ct. App.
1976), affd, 235 S.E.2d 532 (Ga. 1977).
70. See generally Steven B. Bass, Comment, The Impact of the 1986 Superfund Amendments
and Reauthorization Act on the Commercial Lending Industry: A Critical Assessment, 41 U. MtaMi
L. REv. 879, 909 (1987) (questioning the soundness of imposing liability for cleanup costs
on commercial lenders who have taken no part in the production or release of any hazard-
ous substances).
71. See infra text accompanying note 160 and notes 213-215 and accompanying text.
72. See generally Omar S. Parker, Jr., Caveat Emptor Is Further Eroded by Health, Environmen-
tal Worries, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 14, 1988, at 26 (discussing how environmental and health con-
cerns have complicated real estate disclosure issues).
73. In comparison, the French civil code requires that land sellers disclose known de-
fects. BARRY NICHotAs, THE FRENCH LAW OF CoNrrAcT 103 (2d ed. 1992) (citing a number
of recent decisions in which the court ruled against sellers who failed to disclose, for exam-
ple, that a parcel of land could never qualify for planning permission, the existence of
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emptor remains the basic legal rule of land transfer in modern Eng-
land and Wales,"4 and "the guiding rule of thumb" of Irish
conveyancing. 75
In 1988 an English legal reform commission recommended aban-
doning the doctrine of caveat emptor and requiring disclosure of ma-
terial information by real property vendors. 76 England's land
conveyancing professional bodies reacted with strenuous opposition
to the proposed radical alteration of the well-understood relationship
of parties to the sale of land." What ultimately emerged from this
process in 1990 was the "TransAction Protocol," a nonbinding na-
tional policy of voluntary seller disclosure to prospective purchasers of
standard basic information. 78 The protocol has come under intense
plans for a piggery near their country house, or the inadequacy of the water supply for the
buyer's intended hotel development). The stern simplicity of the common-law doctrine of
caveat emptor stood in sharp contrast with the civil law's paternalistic rule that a sound
price required a sound commodity. FRIEDMAN, supra note 52, at 262-66, 540-41. This diver-
gence was a major factor in California's decision in 1850 to adopt the common law. Id. at
540-41. For an excellent comparative analysis of the theoretical models of the legal duty to
inform under English common and French civil law, see Rittenberg, supra note 30, at 156-
58 & nn.19-22.
74. KEVIN GRAY, ELEMENTS OF LAND LAw 245-46 (2d ed. 1993); A.G. GuEST, ANSON'S
LAw OF CONTRACT 210 (26th ed. 1984); I.R. STOREY, CONVEYANCING 38 (4th ed. 1993).
English courts have long made an exception in cases involving latent nonphysical
defects, such as unrecorded tenancies, easements, and covenants, not reasonably discovera-
ble by purchasers. See GRAY, supra, at 246; STOREY, supra, at 38. Exceptions" also have been
recognized in cases in which purchasers asked vendors for specific information, the parties
occupied a fiduciary relationship, and vendors deliberately concealed physical defects. See
D.G. BARNSLEY, BARNSLEY'S CONVEVANCING LAW AND PRACTICE 172 (3d ed. 1988).
75. J.C.W. WYLIE, IRISH LAND LAw 112 (2d ed. 1986); see a/soJ.C.W. WYLIE, IRISH CON-
VEYANCING LAw 150 (1978) ("It is not the vendor's duty to disclose defects in the physical
condition of his property but rather it is the duty of the purchaser to protect himself by
making an inspection of the property and, if necessary, commissioning a survey of the
property.").
76. H.W. Wilkinson, Conveyancer's Notebook: TransAction or OverAction?, CoNv. & PROP.
L. 137, 137 (1990) ("[A] vendor of land should be under a positive duty to disclose all
material facts about the property he is selling, providing he is aware of those facts or ought
reasonably to be aware of them. To this significant extent the caveat emptor rule should be
reversed.").
77. Id. Although, in typical British understatement, the Conveyancer noted simply that
the proposal was received "without enthusiasm." Id. n.1.
78. The protocol envisages that, as soon as property is placed on the market for sale,
sellers should supply a range of detailed information described on a standardized form
containing the following warning: "IF YOU DO NOT FOLLOW THESE INSTRUCTIONS
YOU MAY HAVE TO PAY COMPENSATION TO THE BUYER." Id. at 140. However, ex-
cept for latent nonphysical defects, there is no generalized duty of disclosure in England
aside from the protocol, which is not compulsory. GRAY, supra note 74, at 245-47. Accord-
ingly, it is unclear why a seller who did not follow the instructions in the disclosure form
would incur liability.
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criticism from commentators in Great Britain, 79 and it remains uncer-
tain whether the land conveyancing bar will embrace reform.
80
Until recently, Canadian courts shared their British counterparts'
reluctance to impose disclosure duties in real property transactions.
For example, following extensive geophysical exploration in the early
1960s, an American mining company, Texas Gulf Sulphur, acquired
mineral rights to property in Ontario containing zinc ore with a value
of $2 billion.81 In order to keep its discovery a secret, Texas Gulf took
evasive action to throw its competitors off the scent, and managed to
conduct its exploration activities in a manner that did not tip off the
vendors regarding the extent of the mineral deposits located on their
property.8 2 After discovering the true value of the deposits, and disap-
pointed by the inadequacy of the consideration received, the vendors
filed suit.83 The Ontario High Court ruled in favor of Texas Gulf, and
claimed the company was only doing "what any prudent mining com-
pany would have done to acquire property in which it knew a very
promising anomaly lay."
84
However, the real estate brokerage industry in British Columbia
and parts of Ontario has recently begun to require sellers to disclose
known hidden defects as a condition to gaining access to the multiple
79. The Conveyancer has warned solicitors that the protocol threatens the attorneyclient
relationship as sellers react negatively to attorney pressure to comply. Wilkinson, supra
note 76, at 140. It is "well calculated to put buyer and seller into a state of armed neutrality
and mutual suspicion." Id. The Conveyancer questioned the likely reaction of elderly sell-
ers, widows, "or the simply unorganised" when "faced with the need to recall when the
house was last rewired, where the woodworm guarantee is, or whether there has been any
building work on the premises in the last four years ('do they mean getting those slates put
back?')." Id. at 141. Another commentator has warned that unless the protocol achieves
widespread adoption, a party selling a home under the protocol and buying another could
face a dilemma if his seller does not comply. STOREY, supra note 74, at 72-73.
80. STOREY, supra note 74, at 72-73 ("It has to be said that, at the time of [this] writing,
by no means all the domestic conveyancing transactions conducted by solicitors are proto-
col transactions.").
81. Leitch Gold Mines, Ltd. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 1 O.1R 469, 469 (1968).
82. Id. at 488-92.
83. Id. at 470. To compare and contrast the transferor's legal obligation to disclose
material information under the common law of land sales and the federal securities laws,
see SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc) (holding
that trading based on undisclosed material information violates federal securities laws),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971).
84. Leitch, 1 O.R. at 493. More recent Canadian decisions recognize a duty to disclose
information in the commercial real estate transaction context. See Olsen v. Poirier, 111
D.L.R.3d 512 (CA 1980) (entitling purchaser to rescission when vendor of dairy farm
failed to disclose knowledge of reduction in milk quota upon sale); Tuttahs v. Maciak, 6
Man. R.2d 52 (Q.B. 1980), available in CAN. ABRIDGMENT 2D 63, R17D (Supp. 1994), (al-
lowing purchaser of restaurant to rescission and damages when vendor failed to disclose
unsuitability of water for cooking and drinking).
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listing service, a powerful vehicle for maximizing market exposure.8 5
The Toronto Star has reported with smug satisfaction that the identical
policy reform imposed by governmental fiat in the United States86 is
being achieved through private sector initiative in Canada.17
II. THE COMMON-LAW DurY TO DISCLOSE INFORMATION
It is difficult to imagine custom, practice, or law ever reaching the
point where contracting parties will be expected to volunteer every-
thing they know about a subject property in an arm's length real es-
tate transaction. 88  Arguably, an informed party should not be
obligated to share informational advantages achieved through delib-
erate and costly research. 9 Nevertheless, there can be no economic
justification for withholding information about a property's defects ac-
quired through no positive investment of resources besides the experi-
ence of having resided there. A rule of law requiring disclosure of
information casually acquired neither reduces the incentive to pro-
duce information nor expropriates any legitimate advantage of skill or
shrewdness.90 When a seller knows that disclosure of material infor-
mation would correct a mistake as to a basic assumption by the buyer,
and when nondisclosure constitutes a failure to act in good faith and
in accordance with reasonable standards of fair dealing,91 the with-
holding of information may be equated with, and given the same legal
effect as, fraudulent misrepresentation.92
A. Common-Law Duty to Disclose Physical Defects
During a pre-closing visit to the house he and his wife were con-
sidering for purchase, Warren Hill observed a small "ripple" in par-
85. Silverstein, supra note 12.
86. See infra notes 187-193 and accompanying text.
87. Silverstein, supra note 12.
88. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 161 cmt. a (1981); see, e.g., Noss v. Abrams,
787 S.W.2d 834, 838 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that a sophisticated real estate devel-
oper owed no duty to disclose to seller of single family home that fair market value of
property was much higher than contract price).
89. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551 cmt. k (1977) ("To a considerable ex-
tent, sanctioned by the customs and mores of the community, superior information and
better business acumen are legitimate advantages which lead to no liability."); Anthony T.
Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 33
(1978) (arguing that the law of contracts recognizes a property right in information that
results from a deliberate and costly search and that the possesor of such information need
not disclose it); see also CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 77-85 (1981).
90. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 97 (3d ed. 1986).
91. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 161(b) (1981).
92. Id. § 161 cmt. b.
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quet teakwood flooring on a step leading from the sunken living room
to the dining room.93 As maintenance supervisor at a school district,
Hill had seen similar "ripples," which had turned out to be the result
of termite damage.94 Hill asked the sellers, Ora and Barbara Jones,
whether the condition he observed could be termite damage.95 Mrs.
Jones replied that a broken water heater had caused water damage in
the dining room area necessitating repairs to the floor. 6 Hill was not
entirely satisfied with the explanation, but decided to wait for the re-
sults of a termite inspection upon which the contract was
contingent.97
The parties closed the deal after the termite inspection report
found neither visible infestation nor evidence of previous treatment
or damage.9" Upon taking possession, the Hills found within the
home a pamphlet entitled "Termites, the Silent Saboteurs," learned
about past termite infestation from a neighbor, and noticed that the
wood on the steps leading to the sunken living room was crumbling.99
A subsequent termite inspection by the same inspector confirmed the
existence of termite damage to the floor, steps, and wood columns of
the house.100
The Hills filed suit for rescission, claiming that the sellers had
fraudulently withheld knowledge of the history of termite infestation
and existence of termite damage.' 01 At trial, the court granted the
sellers' motion for summary judgment. 1 2 The Arizona Court of Ap-
peals reversed, holding that the sellers owed a duty to disclose their
knowledge of termite damage that was unknown to the Hills and ma-
terially affected the value of the residence."0 '







100. Id. When confronted with this information, the termite inspector complained that,
in accordance with industry custom, he should have been told of any history of termite
infestation and treatment before performing his inspection. Id. at 1117; see also Mitchell v.
Skubiak, 618 N.E.2d 1013, 1019 (Il1. App. Ct. 1993) ("A duty to speak or disclose defects to
a professional inspector arises under the same conditions as when a home is inspected by
the buyer personally.").
101. Hi/, 725 P.2d at 1115.
102. Id. at 1115-16.
103. Id. at 1118. The court noted that an affirmative duty to disclose exists under the
following circumstances:
1. Disclosure is necessary to prevent a previous assertion from being a mis-
representation or from being fraudulent or material;
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Other courts have recognized a duty to disclose information to
prospective purchasers in a variety of contexts involving cracked foun-
dations,1" 4 leaking roofs, structural defects, 10 5 unstable soil condi-
tions,' °6  infestation by cockroaches, 1 7  and defective sewage
disposal.' Additionally, nondisclosure of environmental contamina-
tion, 0 9 radon, 10 and asbestos... has become a fertile source of litiga-
tion in recent years.11
2
2. Disclosure would correct a mistake of the other party as to a basic as-
sumption on which that party is making the contract and if nondisclosure
amounts to a failure to act in good faith and in accordance with reasonable stan-
dards of fair dealing;
3. Disclosure would correct a mistake of the other party as to the contents
or effect of a writing, evidencing or embodying an agreement in whole or in part;
4. The other person is entitled to know the fact because of a relationship of
trust and confidence between them.
Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551 (1977)).
104. Thacker v. Tyree, 297 S.E.2d 885, 886 (W. Va. 1982).
105. Johnson v. Davis, 480 So. 2d 625, 629 (Fla. 1985) (imposing duty to disclose leaking
roof in three-year-old home).
106. Easton v. Strassburger, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383, 385-86 (Ct. App. 1984); Blake v. Doe, 623
N.E.2d 1229, 1231 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993).
107. Weintraub v. Krobatsch, 317 A.2d 68, 71 (N.J. 1974) (characterizing a no-duty-todis-
close case cited by seller as one in "a line of 'singularly unappetizing cases' ... out of tune
with our times" (quoting W. PAGE PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS § 106, at 696 (4th ed. 1971))).
108. Holcomb v. Zinke, 365 N.W.2d 507, 512 (N.D. 1985); Anderson v. Harper, 622
A.2d 319, 324-25 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993). Latency of defect is a recurring theme in cases
imposing a duty to share information. Anderson, 622 A.2d at 323. Sewer connections, by
their subterranean nature, are not open to inspection. Id. at 324.
109. See Jane M. Draper, Annotation, Vendor's Obligation to Disclose to Purchaser of Land
Presence of Contamination from Hazardous Substances or Wastes, 12 A.L.R.5TH 630 (1993).
110. Compare Schnell v. Gustafson, 638 P.2d 850, 852 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981) (holding
that sellers could be held liable for fraudulent nondisclosure of radon hazard after not
taking corrective action following a warning by the health department) with Wayne v. Ten-
nessee Valley Auth., 730 F.2d 392, 395 (5th Cir. 1984) (affirming summary judgment dis-
missing fraudulent concealment claim because the TVA could not reasonably have known
of radon hazard that resulted from construction of plaintiffs' house in 1968 using cement
blocks made of radon-contaminated phosphate slag), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1159 (1985). See
also T & E Indus. v. Safety Light Corp., 587 A.2d 1249, 1257-58 (NJ. 1991) (holding that
caveat emptor does not bar land purchaser's recovery when seller has engaged in the ab-
normally dangerous activity of processing radium on the property).
According to the EPA, radon represents the greatest health hazard of any environ-
mental pollutant, ranking behind only cigarette smoking as the second leading cause of
lung cancer. Eleanor Charles, Waterborne Radon Joins Airborne Type as Problem, N.Y. TjMrs,
Feb. 19, 1995, § 9, at 11.
111. See, e.g., Heider v. Leewards Creative Crafts, Inc., 613 N.E.2d 805, 817-18 (111. App.
Ct. 1993) (remanding suit for fraud and tortious interference based on buyer's discovery of
asbestos on property).
112. Seriousness of defect is a common feature of cases imposing a duty to share infor-
mation. Compare Anderson v. Harper, 622 A.2d 319, 325 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (holding
that sellers had duty to disclose known defective sewage system) with Gozon v. Henderson-
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A legal duty to "speak up" does not arise simply because two par-
ties may have been sitting across the bargaining table when a deal was
struck between them."' The common theme running through the
nondisclosure jurisprudence is the prevention of situations in which
buyers labor under serious misapprehension and are unable to ration-
ally assess the true level of risk involved in the bargain.114 The duty to
disclose arises when contracting parties do not stand on equal footing
because one possesses superior knowledge not reasonably available to
the other.'1 5
This was the case in Colgan v. Washington Realty Co." 6 A hard rain
fell on the day Donald and Dorothy Colgan closed on the purchase of
their new home. Soon after, water seeping through the patio caused
the garage roof to collapse onto their automobile. 17 The purchasers
had been informed by the sellers that the only water leakage problem
previously experienced was a broken water pipe that had since been
repaired. 1 The purchasers filed suit, claiming that absence of un-
resolved water leakage problems was a material inducement to their
decision to purchase the property.11 9 The trial judge granted the sell-
Dewey & Assocs., 458 A.2d 605, 607 (Pa. Super. C. 1983) (holding that sellers had no duty
to disclose non-dangerous patent defects in swimming pool).
113. Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429,435 (7th Cir. 1987) ("Strangers transact
in markets all the time using private information that might be called 'material' and, un-
less one has a duty to disclose, both may keep their counsel." (citations omitted)), cert.
dismissed, 485 U.S. 901 (1988).
114. For example, in a typical formulation, the West Virginia Supreme Court held that,
[W]here a vendor is aware of defects or conditions which substantially affect the
value or habitability of the property and the existence of which are unknown to
the purchaser and would not be disclosed by a reasonably diligent inspection,
then the vendor has a duty to disclose the same to the purchaser .... [F]ailure to
disclose will give rise to a cause of action in favor of the purchaser.
Thacker v. Tyree, 297 S.E.2d 885, 888 (W. Va. 1982).
115. In Osterberger v. Hites Constr. Co., 599 S.W.2d 221 (Mo. C. App. 1980), the court
held that sophisticated sellers of a single family home owed a duty to disclose the existence
of a recorded deed of trust encumbering the property to first-time homebuyers. Id. at 227-
28. Because the entire transaction was completed within a single day, purchasers had no
time to seek assistance from a tidtle insurer or attorney. Id. at 228. Instead, a seller with
superior knowledge prepared and explained the documentation to purchasers, and
although the parties were not in a fiduciary relationship, buyers had relied upon sellers.
Id. Under these circumstances, the court was not persuaded that, as a matter of public
record, the deed of trust was reasonably discoverable. Id. at 228-29. But see Fairmont Foods
Co. v. Skelly Oil Co., 616 S.W.2d 548, 552 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (holding the seller owed no
duty to disclose impairment of access to subject property by condemnation action to major
corporation that had not exercised reasonable care to discover information within its
reach).
116. 879 S.W.2d 686 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994).





ers' motion for summary judgment, noting that purchasers who make
independent investigation of the physical condition of real property
are presumed to have relied upon the results of their inspection.1 20
The Missouri Court of Appeals reversed, observing that in the vast
majority of cases, material information about the condition of a resi-
dence will be peculiarly within sellers' knowledge and difficult for pur-
chasers to obtain. 121 Most homebuyers will be unable to achieve
parity of information with long-time homeowners, even by conducting
a professional building inspection.'2 2 Judicial recognition that ven-
dors and purchasers are not equal players challenges the basic under-
lying assumption of the doctrine of caveat emptor. 123
Where a defective condition is open to observation or otherwise
reasonably discoverable, and a purchaser has an opportunity to ex-
amine the premises before closing, the seller may be protected by the
doctrine of caveat emptor unless, of course, there is evidence of
120. Id. at 690. The purchasers hired an independent professional to inspect the prop-
erty. Id. The inspector's report noted the existence of "small voids" in the grout between
patio tiles, and recommended application of silicone sealer to protect against possible leak-
age into the garage area. Id.
121. Id. at 691. According to an affidavit by a home improvement worker filed in oppo-
sition to their summary judgment motion, the sellers had hired him to paint and caulk the
deck, believing that would stop water leakage into the garage. Id. at 690. However, he did
not know whether the work he had done corrected the problem. Id. According to an
affidavit by the previous owner of the residence, he had experienced and attempted to
correct water leakage on at least two occasions. Id. The court held that reasonable minds
could conclude, entirely from this circumstantial evidence, that the sellers were aware of
active water leakage problems. Id.
122. The Colgan court made this point by noting that
a seller, who has lived in a property, as opposed to a mere investor, would have
knowledge which is superior to a buyer's knowledge concerning the property's
condition. In this case, for example, sellers may have lived in the house through
some rainstorms. Buyers, in contrast, sent an inspector into the house for a few
hours, an inspector who may or may not have been in the house while it rained.
Obviously, the sellers would have a better vantage position of the leakage prob-
lem and the severity of the condition.
Id. at 691; see also Holcomb v. Zinke, 365 N.W.2d 507, 512 (N.D. 1985) ("While the relation-
ship between seller and buyer may not be a fiduciary or confidential one, it is marked by
the clearly superior position of the seller vis-a-vis knowledge of the condition of the prop-
erty being sold.").
123. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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fraud.12 4 Either constructive notice or actual knowledge of the defec-
tive condition is a defense to buyer's claim. 125
This principle is aptly illustrated by Layman v. Burns.1 2 6 In Lay-
man, the purchasers bought a home only later to discover that the
home had a foundation defect. 127 Prior to closing, the purchasers in-
spected the basement and noticed the I-beams supporting the walls. 128
Assuming the I-beams to be part of the structure, the purchasers
bought the home.12 9 When the purchasers subsequently tried to re-
sell the house, a broker called their attention to the defective base-
ment walls. t3° Unable to sell, the purchasers defaulted on their
mortgage. 131
In their subsequent lawsuit against the sellers, the trial court
awarded the purchasers damages of $40,000.132 On appeal, the
Supreme Court of Ohio reversed, holding that when a defective con-
dition is open to observation or discoverable upon reasonable inspec-
tion, and the purchaser has the unimpeded opportunity to examine
the property, the defense of caveat emptor remains available to the
seller. 133
124. Anglo-Saxon common law has long recognized an exception to the doctrine of
caveat emptor for causes of action for intentional fraudulent misrepresentation. HUNTER,
supra note 41, 19.02(3). Similarly, the defense of caveat emptor is not available when the
seller actively and knowingly concealed a material physical defect that could not have been
discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence. Gibb v. Citicorp Mortgage, Inc.,
518 N.W.2d 910,918 (Neb. 1994). Suppression of defective conditions by disguising them,
covering them up, or otherwise preventing purchasers from discovering them constitutes
fraud. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Skubiak, 618 N.E.2d 1013, 1016 (II. App. Ct. 1993) (indoor-
outdoor carpeting glued to porch and steps to conceal structural damage); Barylski v. An-
drews, 439 S.W.2d 536, 540 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969) (fire damage concealed by paint, paper,
plaster, and wallboard); Kracl v. Loseke, 461 N.W.2d 67, 72 (Neb. 1990) (sheetrock placed
on basement ceiling to conceal termite damage to wooden floor joists).
125. But see Flakus v. Schug, 329 N.W.2d 859, 862-64 (Neb. 1983) (finding that observa-
tion of sump pump in basement laundry room was insufficient to charge purchasers with
constructive notice of two other sump pumps in basement closets), ovemded on other
grounds by Nielsen v. Adams, 388 N.W.2d 840, 846 (Neb. 1986) (noting buyer's observation
of sump pump in basement did not discharge seller's duty to disclose water leakage
problem).
126. 519 N.E.2d 642 (Ohio 1988).
127. Id. at 642-43. The foundation defect was caused by improper backfilling during
construction. Id.





133. Id. at 645. In coming to this conclusion, the court rejected the trial court's finding
that the defect was not obviously observable upon reasonable inspection by non-experts,
noting that the wall was "bulging" and that other witnesses had detected the bow with little
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Real estate vendors were once advised that contractual exculpa-
tion clauses would shield them against legal liability for failing to dis-
close defective conditions." 4 Since the erosion of the doctrine of
caveat emptor, however, "as is" and integration clauses are no longer
completely dependable, because courts in some instances have im-
posed liability on sellers for breach of the duty to disclose information
notwithstanding these provisions.1 35
B. Common-Law Duty to Disclose Nonphysical Conditions
An action for fraudulent nondisclosure is likely to focus on
whether a defective condition is significantly material.'3 6 A condition
that does not affect a property's market value13 1 or physical safety'13
may not be considered a material defect.'13  Materiality, a function of
the expectation of objectively reasonable purchasers, is the central is-
effort. Id. at 644. The result would have been different under a 1993 Ohio statute requir-
ing seller disclosure of known physical defects. See infra note 187.
134. See genera//y FrankJ. Wozniak, Annotation, Construction and Effect of Provision in Con-
tract for Sale of Realty by Which Purchaser Agrees to Take Property "As Is" or in Its Existing Condi-
tion, 8 A.L.R.5TH 312 (1992).
135. Compare, e.g., Stemple v. Dobson, 400 S.E.2d 561, 566 (W. Va. 1990) (holding that
"as is" clause did not extinguish buyers' suit for fraudulent concealment) with Conahan v.
Fisher, 463 N.W.2d 118, 119 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that seller owed no duty to
disclose termite problem in "as is" sale where buyers' professional inspection revealed no
infestation).
In Raskin v. Chrysler Realty Corp., No. 93-1218, 1994 Wis. App. LEXIS 1381, at *1
(Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 8, 1994), the court held that the purchaser of a vacant automobile
dealership could not recover damages from the seller for failure to disclose environmental
contamination. Id. at *14. After purchasing the property, buyer discovered that it con-
tained petroleum-contaminated soil from three tanks that had been removed prior to sale.
Id. at *8. Under the terms of the contract, buyer agreed to purchase the property in "'as is'
condition and subject to all faults of every kind and nature whatsoever whether latent or
patent and now or hereafter existing." Id. at *3. The court held that the broad disclaimer
clause insulated seller from liability for nondisclosure, and shifted the burden to buyer to
determine the condition of the property. Id. at *14. Contra Channel Master Satellite Sys. v.
JFD Elec. Corp., 702 F. Supp. 1229, 1232 (E.D.N.C. 1988) (holding that "as is" clause in
sales agreement did not release seller from liability for hazardous substance contamination
of the subject property).
136. "A fact is material if a reasonable purchaser would attach importance to its exist-
ence or nonexistence in determining the choice of action in the transaction in ques-
tion. . . ." Ollerman v. O'Rourke Co., 288 N.W.2d 95, 107 (Wis. 1980); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538 (1977).
137. See Karoutas v. Homefed Bank, 283 Cal. Rptr. 809, 811 (Ct. App. 1991) (noting that
undisclosed facts are considered material if they have a "significant and measurable effect
on market value").
138. See Gozon v. Henderson-Dewey & Assocs., 458 A.2d 605, 606 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983)
(holding that a leaking swimming pool was neither dangerous nor latent and thus seller
had no duty to disclose); Mobley v. Copeland, 828 S.W.2d 717, 725-26 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992)
(holding that there was no duty to disclose slight electrical current in swimming pool).
139. Parker, supra note 72, at 26.
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sue in a controversial line of recent decisions involving nondisclosure
of "psychological" defects. Legislative action eventually became neces-
sary to reverse common-law expansion of the concept of materiality
into the area of these nonphysical, "psychological" conditions.
40
1. Psychological Defects.-Well-publicized cases involving murder,
AIDS, and poltergeists have focused public and state legislative atten-
tion on an evolving legal duty to disclose the existence of nonphysical,
psychological defects to prospective purchasers. 141 The market value
of affected real estate is significantly reduced once potential purchas-
ers become aware of this information. 42 As a result, these properties
are sometimes described as "stigmatized.""14
The genesis of the doctrine mandating the disclosure of these
types of defects was Reed v. King."4 In Reed, the seller and the seller's
broker failed to disclose that the subject property had been the scene
of a multiple axe murder a decade earlier.1 1 5 After learning about the
home's gruesome history from a neighbor, the purchaser filed suit for
rescission and damages.'46 The trial court granted defendants' mo-
tion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. 147 The court of appeals,
acknowledging that reputation and history do influence market
value,148 held that the purchaser could recover against the seller and
broker for failure to disclose if she could prove that the brutal crime
materially reduced the value of the property. 49 Concerned that its
holding would "permit[ ] the camel's nose of unrestrained irrational-
140. See infra notes 188-189 and accompanying text.
141. Paula C. Murray, What Constitutes a Defect in Real Property?, 22 REAL Esr. L.J. 61, 63
(1993) ("Although it may seem bizarre, brokers are routinely asking sellers for this
information.").
142. For example, the Los Angeles home where actress Sharon Tate and six others were
murdered in 1969 by followers of Charles Manson was recently torn down after years on
the market. Suzanne Gordon, "Stigmatized Houses" Where Crime Strikes, Sometimes Teardown is
the Only Answer, CHI. TRiB., June 3, 1995, at HG14. Furthermore, local real estate agents
predict that the condominium owned by the estate of Nicole Brown Simpson is likely to sit
vacant for three years before finally selling for 70% of market value. Id.
143. Sharlene A. McEvoy, Stigmatized Property: What a Buyer Should Know, 48J. Mo. B. 57
(1992).
144. 193 Cal. Rptr. 130 (Ct. App. 1983).
145. Id. at 130. The seller represented that the premises were in good condition and
were fit for an "elderly lady" living alone. Id. at 131. He had even asked a neighbor not to
inform the buyer of the crime. Id.
146. Id. at 130.
147. Id. at 131.
148. Id. at 133 ("'George Washington slept here' is worth something, however physically




ity admission to the tent,"150 the court emphasized the fact-specific
context of the case at hand.' 5 1
Nevertheless, as the first case to require disclosure of information
about a property's notoriety that would likely affect a purchaser's ac-
quisition decision, Reed sent a loud and clear message to real property
sellers and their brokers. In the wake of Reed, sellers and brokers
would need to consider purchaser psychology as well as structural
integrity.
Following Reed, a New York appellate court decided a celebrated
case concerning a seller's duty to disclose a home's reputation for be-
ing inhabited by poltergeists. 1 2 For ten years Helen Ackley publi-
cized an eighteen-room Nyack, New York, residence overlooking the
Hudson River as "haunted" by spirits."5 ' However, she failed to dis-
close this information to the eventual purchaser, New York bond
traderJeffrey Stambovsky.' 54 Upon discovering the property's notori-
ety, Stambovsky refused to consummate closing, and filed suit to re-
scind the contract and recover the $32,500 he had deposited toward
the $650,000 purchase price. 5 5 Noting the continued vitality of the
doctrine of caveat emptor in New York,'56 the trial court granted the
seller's motion to dismiss.'57 The appellate court reversed on appeal,
holding buyer's complaint sufficient to state a cause of action for re-
scission.' Having informed the public of its haunted character, the
court held that the seller owed a duty to furnish the home's out-of-
town buyer with the same information. 59
150. Id. at 132.
151. Multiple murder, the court observed, "is highly unusual in its potential for so dis-
turbing buyers they may be unable to reside in a home where it has occurred." Id. at 133.
152. Stambovsky v. Ackley, 572 N.Y.S.2d 672 (App. Div. 1991).
153. Prior to offering it for sale, seller promoted the house on a local walking tour as "a
riverfront Victorian (with ghost)." Id. at 674. She had actively fostered public impression
of the haunting through articles published in the Reader's Digest and the local press. Id.
154. Id. at 675.
155. Id. at 678.
156. Id. at 675. For this proposition the trial court cited London v. Courduff, 529
N.Y.S.2d 874, 875 (App. Div.), appeal dismissed, 537 N.Y.S.2d 494 (N.Y. 1988), which in-
volved a seller's failure to disclose knowledge of property's use as landfill. Id. The London
court noted that "[t]he buyer has the duty to satisfy himself as to the quality of his bargain
pursuant to the doctrine caveat emptor, which in New York State still applies to real estate
transactions." Id.
157. Stambovsky, 572 N.Y.S.2d at 674.
158. Id. at 677. Presumably the court limited the relief available to rescission to test the
extent of the buyer's psychological aversion to haunting (not unlike the thinking behind
the doctrine of constructive eviction, where tenant must substantiate landlord's breach of
the covenant of quiet enjoyment by incurring the hardship of relocation). A. JAMES
CASNER & W. BARTON LEACH, PROPERTry 500-01 (3d ed. 1984).
159. The Stambovsky court set the standard by noting that
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Applying the Reed and Stambovsky logic to the disclosure of other
types of nonphysical psychological "defects," purchasers may in the
future seek to rescind or collect damages on the grounds that a home
was formerly occupied by a person who died from AIDS-related com-
plications. Although there is no scientific evidence that the AIDS vi-
rus is transmitted by contact with a home formerly occupied by an
infected person, prospective homebuyers may nevertheless deem it
important to know whether a previous occupant had the disease. If it
were possible to discover this information, the market value of af-
fected property likely would be reduced. This information, by its very
nature, is unlikely to be discoverable during the course of a routine
inspection. Therefore, a buyer's reliance upon a seller's disclosure is
even greater under these circumstances than in the case of physical
defects. Accordingly, and following the logic of Reed and Stambovsky,
the fact that a previous occupant died from AIDS-related complica-
tions would seem to require disclosure.16 ° The impact of Reed and
Stambovsky, and the uncertainty surrounding the issue of disclosure
involving AIDS, have driven the brokerage industry to lobby sympa-
thetic state legislatures nationwide to enact statutes providing that
some nonphysical defects are not material and need not be disclosed
to prospective purchasers of affected property.16
2. Deleterious Off-Site Conditions. -During a pre-closing walk-
through inspection of the home she was about to purchase, Kitty Van
Camp asked about the reason for bars she observed on the basement
windows."6 2 In the presence of the brokers, owner Connie Bradford
responded by describing a break-in that had occurred sixteen years
previously, but disclosed neither the rape that had occurred in the
residence a few months earlier, nor another rape occurring in a
neighboring home a month later.1 6 3 Upon taking occupancy, Van
Camp learned of the serious crimes that had occurred in the home
[w]here a condition which has been created by the seller materially impairs the
value of the contract and is peculiarly within the knowledge of the seller or un-
likely to be discovered by a prudent purchaser exercising due care with respect to
the subject transaction, nondisclosure constitutes a basis for rescission as a matter
of equity.
Stambovsky, 572 N.Y.S.2d at 676.
Statements in subsequent cases have reiterated New York's retention of the doctrine
of caveat emptor in residential real estate transactions. E.g., Simms v. Biondo, 816 F. Supp.
814, 820 (E.D.N.Y. 1993); Copland v. Diamond, 624 N.Y.S.2d 514, 521 (Sup. Ct. 1995).
160. See infra note 215.
161. See infra notes 188-189 and accompanying text.
162. Van Camp v. Bradford, 623 N.E.2d 731, 734 (Ohio C.P. 1993).
163. Id. On the day of the second rape, Bradford listed her home for sale. Id.
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and neighborhood.' 64 After being confronted by Van Camp, one of
the brokers involved in the sale acknowledged that the owner and
both brokers were fully aware of the violent criminal activity at the
time of sale. 165
Van Camp filed suit against the owner and brokers, claiming that
they had withheld knowledge of the unsafe character of the residence
and area, information that would have influenced her decision to
purchase. The court observed that because both seller and purchaser
were single mothers with teenage daughters, the seller should have
known that the buyer "was 'peculiarly disposed' to attach importance
to the subject of female-targeted crimes."166 The court refused to
grant summary judgment for the seller, holding that under the cir-
cumstances nondisclosure of neighborhood criminal activity may have
constituted a material omission.1 6 ' The court noted that reasonable
minds could have construed the buyer's question about the barred
basement windows as a specific solicitation of information regarding
safety of the residence. 6 ' The court held that this affirmative inquiry
imposed a duty on the seller to speak truthfully about the reason for
the bars. 169
Similarly, the New Jersey Supreme Court recently held that hav-
ing marketed their housing development as a "peaceful, bucolic set-
ting with an abundance of fresh air and clean lake waters," vendor-
builders were liable for failing to disclose to buyers of single-family
residences that their homes were located within one-half mile of a
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 740.
167. Id. The court granted the brokers' motion for summary judgment holding they
owed no duty to disclose knowledge of the crimes simply by reason of being present at the
time of Van Camp's inquiry. Id. at 741. While the court's distinction between the conduct
of seller and brokers may seem tenuous at first glance, it falls squarely within the parame-
ters of the legal definition of "active concealment." Id. The seller's representation, accom-
panied by suppression of facts, conveyed a misleading impression, which had the effect of
impliedly representing that the fact concealed did not exist. Id. Had the brokers similarly
misrepresented or failed to disclose material information in response to an inquiry di-
rected to them, summary judgment would not have been granted. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 740-41. The court identified the following material issues of fact for determi-
nation at trial: (1) whether Van Camp inquired about the safety of the premises; (2)
whether Bradford failed to disclose a material fact; (3) whether Van Camp relied upon
Bradford's withholding of information regarding safety of the residence in forming her
purchase decision; (4) whether Van Camp was put on notice that there was a potential
problem regarding safety of the residence by the total mix of information available to her
notwithstanding Bradford's nondisclosure; (5) whether Van Camp reasonably conducted
her duty of inspection and further inquiry when examining the subject property for de-
fects; and (6) the nature and extent of buyer's damages. Id.
[VOL. 55:387
DOUBTING THE DEMISE OF CAVEAT EMPTOR
toxic waste dump.1 70 However, in a preemptive strike against hypo-
thetical claims by future disgruntled purchasers, the court sought to
distinguish its decision from mere "transient social conditions in the
community," such as the proximity of a group home or a neighbor-
hood school in decline.17 ' Notwithstanding the attempt to limit its
scope, the reasoning behind this holding has potentially far-reaching
consequences. 
72
3. Easements, Building Codes, and Ordinance Violations. -The focus
in cases involving nondisclosure of easements and building code and
local ordinance violations will generally be on the materiality and ac-
cessibility of the omitted information. When a court determines that
an easement or ordinance violation that is not readily accessible to a
reasonably prudent purchaser materially affects the market value of a
parcel of property, a duty to disclose is likely to be held to exist. 173 If
the omitted information does not constitute a material fact or is read-
ily accessible, there is generally no duty to disclose. 1 74 However, if a
170. Strawn v. Canuso, 657 A.2d 420, 429 (N.J. 1995).
171. Id. at 431.
172. For example, the California Court of Appeals has been asked to reverse a ruling by
a Van Nuys trial judge dismissing the complaint by purchasers of a $592,000 home that
their vendor-builder wrongfully withheld information regarding the proximity of a rocket-
testing facility, exposing them to potential health hazards from radioactive and chemical
contamination. Jim Tranquada, Court Ruling May Expand Real Estate Disclosure, FRESNO BEE,
May 28, 1995, at D8. But see Blaine v.J.E.Jones Constr. Co., 841 S.W.2d 703 (Mo. Ct. App.
1992), for a case in which buyers of single-family residences sued their vendor-builder for
nondisclosure of plans to build an apartment complex at the entrance to the subdivision.
Id. at 704. Because the seller's intended development would reduce the market value of
their homes, the buyers claimed they would not have acquired property in the subdivision
if they had been made aware of the seller's plans. Id. at 708. Distinguishing between "in-
trinsic" and "extrinsic" facts, the Missouri Court of Appeals held that the seller had no duty
to disclose existence of the development plan, noting that a duty to disclose is more likely
to arise in cases involving intrinsic facts, such as a latent physical defect in the subject
property itself. Id. Here, the seller's intent to build apartments on neighboring property
in the future was extrinsic to the purchase of buyers' homes. Id.
173. See, e.g., Curran v. Heslop, 252 P.2d 378, 381 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1953) (finding a
duty to disclose a building code violation that was a material fact affecting the value of the
home); Gamel v. Lewis, 373 S.W.2d 184, 192 (Mo. Ct. App. 1963) (holding that sellers were
required to disclose that they had obtained extensions of time to comply with municipal
ordinance requirements, and that future improvements would be required to bring prop-
erty up to code, even though the omitted information was a matter of public record);
Lepera v. Fuson, 613 N.E.2d 1060, 1064 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (holding that seller may
have a duty to disclose that use of property as two-family residence violated local zoning
ordinance); Gilbey v. Cooper, 310 N.E.2d 268, 270 (Ohio C.P. 1973) (deciding that ease-
ments recorded three days after property was sold could not reasonably have been discov-
ered by purchaser).
174. See, e.g., Equity Capital Corp. v. Kreider Transp. Serv., 967 F.2d 249, 254 (7th Cir.
1992) (holding that nondisclosed information regarding zoning ordinance violation was
readily ascertainable at reasonable cost); Randels v. Best Real Estate, Inc., 612 N.E.2d 984,
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purchaser inquires directly about these matters, the seller is under a
duty to respond truthfully.1
75
C. Disclosure in Commercial Transactions
Preparing to close on the acquisition of a sixty-three-acre parcel
of raw land in South Florida, the builder of a new home community
experienced what surely must be one of the commercial real estate
developer's worst nightmares.1 76 An archaeological survey revealed
that the property was an ancient Native American campsite and burial
ground, subsequently determined to be the first home of the Semi-
nole Tribe. 177 The historical and archaeological significance of this
property rendered it undevelopable, causing the builder to file suit
against the seller on the grounds that the information had been inten-
tionally withheld.1 78 The court disagreed with the builder, holding
that in the context of a commercial transaction, intentional nondisclo-
sure of known material facts does not state a cause of action. 1 79
As this case illustrates, the doctrine of caveat emptor enjoys con-
siderable continued vitality in those states reluctant to abandon the
doctrine in commercial real estate transactions.'8 0 Courts in other
988-89 (Il1. App. Ct. 1993) (finding that nondisclosed information regarding ordinance
requiring that property be disconnected from septic system and hooked into municipal
sewer system within five years was discoverable by reasonable investigation); Lawton v.
Dracousis, 437 N.E.2d 543, 548 (Mass. App. Ct.) (holding that building code violations
were not material), appeal denied, 440 N.E.2d 1177 (Mass. 1982); Selvin v. Kelshaw, 611 A.2d
1232, 1238-39 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (finding no duty to disclose existence of unrecorded
easement for municipal waterline); Goldfarb v. Dietz, 506 P.2d 1322, 1327 (Wash. Ct. App.
1973) (finding that because purchaser had constructive notice of applicable zoning ordi-
nances, seller was not responsible for failure to disclose that purchaser would be prevented
from rebuilding nonconforming home).
175. See, e.g., Kraft v. Lowe, 77 A.2d 554, 557 (D.C. 1950) (noting that seller had a duty
to answer truthfully and completely in response to a direct question regarding plumbing).




179. Id. Nevertheless, the court granted leave to amend based on specific contractual
language arguably creating a duty to disclose. Id. at 364-65.
180. For example, in Haskell Co. v. Lane Co., 612 So. 2d 669 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), appeal
dismissed sub nom. Service Merchandise Co. v. Lane Co., 620 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 1993), a roof
collapsed during a severe rainstorm four years after sale of a commercial building, causing
significant personal injury to shoppers and property damage. Id. at 670. The court held
that the seller owed no duty to disclose a latent defect in the roof drainage system, even
though the court opined in dicta "that the time has come for a critical evaluation of the
merit of continued adherence to the doctrine of caveat emptor" in commercial real estate
transactions. Id. at 675.
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states, however, have extended the common-law duty of disclosure to
the commercial context.
181
While considerations of justice, fair dealing, and sound public
policy justify imposition of a duty of disclosure in the residential con-
text,182 these elements are less persuasive when sought to be applied
to commercial transactions. 8 ' Some commentators have observed,
however, that purchasers of "real property for business purposes vary
widely in their experience, knowledge, sophistication, bargaining
power, wealth and access to outside advisers and experts."' 84 Never-
theless, the decision to buy a residence differs from the decision to
purchase income-producing commercial property for investment pur-
poses in significant ways that argue for retaining a different legal
doctrine.1 85
181. For example, in Green Spring Farms v. Spring Green Farm Assocs., 492 N.W.2d 392
(Wis. Ct. App. 1992), the cattle on a dairy farm suffered an outbreak of salmonella bacteria
two years after the buyer took possession. Id. at 394. The outbreak resulted in the destruc-
tion of livestock, extensive veterinary care for other dairy cattle, and considerable financial
loss. Id. As a result, the buyer defaulted on land contract payments and the seller com-
menced foreclosure proceedings. Id. The buyer's counterclaim alleged that the seller
knowingly withheld the existence of salmonella contamination. Id. Having denied the
buyer's request for ajury trial on the issue, the trial court granted summary judgment for
the seller. Id. at 393. The appellate court reversed, citing Ollerman v. O'Rourke Co., 288
N.W.2d 95 (Wis. 1980), as authority for "a more enlightened rule which rejects strict appli-
cation of the doctrine of caveat emptor." Green Spring Farms, 492 N.W.2d at 396. This more
"enlightened rule" states that "[t] he doctrine of caveat emptor no longer excuses real estate
sellers from fully disclosing to potential purchasers the existence of conditions which may
be material to the decision to purchase and which the purchaser is in a poor position to
discover." Id. at 397.
182. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
183. See Easton v. Strassburger, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383, 387-90 (Ct. App. 1984) (noting that
"a purchaser of commercial real estate is likely to be more experienced and sophisticated
in his dealings in real estate and is usually represented by an agent who represents only the
buyer's interests").
184. Powell & Mallor, supra note 57, at 333 (footnote omitted); see aLso Haskel, 612 So.
2d at 669; supra note 180. The Haske/! court noted that:
Many of the policy considerations used to justify a duty to disclose in residential
cases apply with equal force to commercial cases .... What of the small business-
man, or professional in solo practice-do they possess the bargaining power to
insist upon express warranties from the seller (or lessor) of a small store or office?
Such distinctions may have some merit as to the large corporate purchaser (or
lessee), but clearly are inappropriate with regard to a substantial segment of the
business community.
Haskel, 612 So. 2d at 675.
185. The purchase of commercial real property for investment purposes is a discretion-
ary decision. After analyzing the comparative advantages of real estate against other avail-
able investment opportunities, the investor dispassionately compares the physical and
economic features of properties on the market. In contrast, home purchase is frequently
occasioned by disorienting changes in either employment or family composition. Addi-
tionally, the decision to purchase residential real estate is often affected by the emotional
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III. THE IMPACT OF MANDATORY DISCLOSURE STATUTES
Because most dwellings and buildings will possess some sort of
"problem" at the time of sale, nearly every transfer of real estate in-
vites litigation instituted by a disappointed buyer. Erosion of the doc-
trine of caveat emptor has confronted real property sellers with the
unhappy prospect of legal liability for conditions their buyers might
discover or even imagine after taking possession. 86 Left unchecked,
this commonaw evolution has the potential to significantly burden
the dispute resolution system and the alienability of real property. In
response to this, mandatory information-disclosure statutes, recently
enacted in approximately half the states, represent a legislative reac-
tion to the erosion of the doctrine of caveat emptor.18 7
These state disclosure statutes accomplish two objectives. First,
they allocate to property sellers the burden of providing a detailed
accounting of their knowledge about defective conditions to prospec-
tive purchasers. Second, they protect sellers from liability for failing
to disclose psychologically stigmatizing conditions, such as when a
homicide, suicide, felony, or death by AIDS occurred on the prop-
erty. ' This is the case because the statutes limit the scope of disclo-
roller coaster of stressful events surrounding involuntary relocation. Recognizing the per-
sonal and financial hardships involved in the purchase of residential real estate, Congress
granted relief from federal income taxation to residential home dispositions. I.R.C.
§ 1034(a) (Supp. 1994) (providing for nonrecognition of gain where taxpayer acquires
replacement residence within 24 months of sale of principal residence).
186. See supra notes 93-181 and accompanying text.
187. ALASKA STAT. §§ 34.70.010-.200 (Supp. 1994); CAL. CrV. CODE §§ 1102-1102.15
(West Supp. 1995); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 2570-2578 (1994); HAw. REv. STAT. §§ 508D-1
to -20 (Supp. 1994); IDAHO CODE §§ 55-2501 to -2512 (1994); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 765, para.
77/1-77/99 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1995); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 24-4.6-2-1 to .-13 (Bums Supp.
1995); IOWA CODE §§ 558A.1-.8 (1995); Ky. RE%,. STAT. ANN. § 324.360 (Michie/Bobbs-Mer-
rill Supp. 1994); MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 10-702 (Supp. 1995); MICH. COMP. LAWS
§§ 565.951-.966 (Supp. 1995); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 89-1-501 to -523 (Supp. 1995); NEB.
REv. STAT. § 76-2,120 (Supp. 1994); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 477:4-c (Supp. 1994); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 5302.30 (Anderson Supp. 1994); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, §§ 831-839
(West Supp. 1995); OR. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 105.465-.490 (Supp. 1994); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§§ 5-20.8-1 to -11 (Supp. 1994); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. §§ 43-4-37 to -44 (Supp. 1995);
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 66-5-201 to -210 (Supp. 1995); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.008 (West
Supp. 1995); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-517 to -525 (Michie 1995); WASH. REv. CODE ANN.
§§ 64.06.005-.900 (West Supp. 1995); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 709.01-.08 (West Supp. 1994).
The National Association of Realtors' active advocacy of mandatory disclosure legisla-
tion has had an influence even in states that have not yet enacted statutes. Real estate
brokers in these jurisdictions seek to persuade sellers to complete voluntary disclosure
forms to advise prospective purchasers of known defects. See ST. Louis ASS'N OF REALTORS,
SELLER'S DISCLOSURE STATEMENT (1992) (on file with author).
188. The following statute enacted in Connecticut is typical:
§ 20-329cc. "Psychologically impacted" defined. "[P]sychologically impacted"
means the effect of certain circumstances surrounding real estate which includes,
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sure to defects that are physical in nature and material in
significance."' Disclosure laws thereby constitute a brake on the ero-
sion of the doctrine of caveat emptor.
but is not limited to: (1) The fact that an occupant of real property is, or was at
any time suspected to be, infected or has been infected with the human immu-
nodeficiency syndrome ... ; or (2) the fact that the property was at any time
suspected to have been the site of a homicide, other felony or a suicide.
§ 20-329dd. Psychological impact. No disclosure required. No cause of action.
(a) The existence of any fact or circumstance which may have a psychologi-
cal impact on the purchaser or lessee is not a material fact that must be disclosed
in a real estate transaction.
(b) No cause of action shall arise against an owner of real estate or his or her
agent for the failure to disclose to the transferee that the transferred property was
psychologically impacted, as defined in section 20-329cc.
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-329cc, -329dd (West Supp. 1995).
See also CAL. Crv. CODE § 1710.2 (West Supp. 1995); COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-35.5-101
(Supp. 1995); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 2929 (Supp. 1994); D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-1936(f)
(Supp. 1995); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 689.25 (West Supp. 1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 44-1-16
(1991); HAw. REV. STAT. § 508D-8 (Supp. 1994); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 225, para. 455/31.1
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1995); IND. CODE ANN. § 24-4.6-2.1-4 (Burns Supp. 1995); Ky. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 207.250 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991 & Supp. 1994); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 37:1468 (West 1995); MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 2-120 (Supp. 1995); MICH. COMP.
LAws § 339.2518 (Supp. 1995); Mo. REv. STAT. § 442.600 (Supp. 1995); NEV. REv. STAT.
§ 40.565 (Supp. 1993); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 477:4-e (Supp. 1994); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-
13-2 (Michie Supp. 1995); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39-50 (Supp. 1994); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tiL 59,
§ 858-513 (West Supp. 1995); OR. REv. STAT. ANN. § 93.275 (1990); RI. GEN. LAws § 5-20.8-
6 (Supp. 1994); S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-57-270 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 66-5-207 (Supp. 1995); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.008 (West Supp. 1995); UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 57-1-1, -37 (1994); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-524 (Michie Supp. 1994); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 452.23 (West Supp. 1994).
Sellers may still owe a duty to disclose information to buyers sufficiently concerned
about such matters and inquiring directly. E.g., Van Camp v. Bradford, 623 N.E.2d 731,
736 (Ohio C.P. 1993) (finding that facts about safety were material and must be disclosed);
see supra notes 162-169 and accompanying text. See also Murray, supra note 141, at 64. The
typical statute does not insulate sellers from liability for intentional misrepresentation. See,
e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1710.2(d) (West Supp. 1994) ("Nothing in this section shall be con-
strued to immunize an owner or his or her agent from making an intentional misrepresen-
tation in response to a direct inquiry from a transferee ... concerning deaths on the real
property."). Oklahoma's statute requires disclosure of nonphysical defects if the buyer
advises the owner or broker in writing that knowledge of psychological impact is important
to his decision to purchase. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 858-513 (West Supp. 1995).
189. Indiana's statute, for example, defines "defect" as a "condition that would have a
significant adverse effect on the value of the property, that would significantly impair the
health or safety of future occupants of the property, or that if not repaired, removed or
replaced would significantly shorten or adversely affect the expected normal life of the
premises." IND. CODE ANN. § 24-4.6-2-4 (Bums Supp. 1995). Nevertheless, such nonphysi-
cal conditions as a neighbor's noisy or hostile behavior may be the subject of mandatory
seller disclosure. See Alexander v. McKnight, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 453, 455 (Ct. App. 1992)




The disclosure statutes vary widely in their applicability19 ° and
comprehensiveness, 91 and most are silent on the issue of time lim-
its.' 92 Additionally, the statutory obligation to disclose generally can-
not be avoided through the use of an "as is" clause. Regardless of
whether sellers choose to warrant the condition of their property or
sell it "as is," disclosure statutes in most states mandate the disclosure
of all known material defects.1 93
In the event that nondisclosure results in litigation, the buyer still
bears the burden of proving to the trier of fact that the seller knew of
a defect materially affecting market value.194 This burden will be of
little comfort, however, to those legal practitioners who advise sellers
190. Most disclosure statutes are limited to transactions involving residential property
containing up to four dwelling units, whether owner-occupied or held by the seller for
investment purposes, on the assumption that buyers engaged in the acquisition of larger
properties presumably are in a position to bargain for express seller warranties. See, e.g.,
CAL. CIv. CODE § 1102 (West Supp. 1995); IND. CODE ANN. § 24-4.6-2-1 (Bums Supp. 1995);
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 5302.30 (Anderson Supp. 1994). Similarly, most statutes do not
apply to the initial sale of newly constructed property, where buyers are generally pro-
tected by home warranty programs and common-law implied warranty doctrine. See, e.g.,
IND. CODE ANN. § 24-4.6-2-1 (Burns Supp. 1995); OHIO REx,. CODE ANN. § 5302.30 (Ander-
son Supp. 1994). Disclosure statutes typically apply to conventional residential land trans-
actions involving contracts of sale, as well as installment land contracts, leases with options
to purchase, and option agreements. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1102 (West Supp. 1995);
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 5302.30 (Anderson Supp. 1994). Properties sold by foreclosure
(and the subsequent sale of foreclosed property by lenders) are often exempted, as are
transfers between spouses and other co-owners. See, e.g., CAL. Civ. CODE § 1102.1 (West
Supp. 1995); IND. CODE ANN. § 24-4.6-2-1 (Bums Supp. 1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 5302.30 (Anderson Supp. 1994).
191. Some state statutes are comprehensive, mandating general disclosure of property
defects from asbestos to zoning. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 565.957 (Supp. 1995); R.I.
GEN. LAws § 5-20.8-2 (Supp. 1994); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 64.06.020 (West Supp. 1995).
In other states, disclosure is limited to matters such as underground storage tanks, hazard-
ous materials, and other environmental concerns. Sellers in New Hampshire, for example,
are required to disclose the presence of radon gas and lead paint, and information about
water-supply and sewage-disposal systems. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 477:4-a, -c (1992 &
Supp. 1994). Many states have promulgated a standardized form for sellers to use. Some
versions are more user-friendly than others, allowing sellers to provide information
through check-offs rather than written narrative description. Compare WASH. REv. CODE
ANN. § 64.06.020 (West Supp. 1995) with CAL. Civ. CODE § 1102.6 (West Supp. 1995).
192. California specifically excludes any duty to disclose the occurrence of an occu-
pant's death more than three years before the date of the offer to purchase. CAL. Cn.
CODE § 1710.2(a) (West Supp. 1995). In other jurisdictions, litigation will be necessary to
determine how remote in time the disclosure duty extends.
193. See supra note 187 and accompanying text. Additionally, in some states, the rights
granted to a purchaser under such a statute may be knowingly and explicitly waived by the
parties to the contract of sale. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-5-202 (Supp. 1995); WASH.
REX,. CODE ANN. § 64.06.020 (West Supp. 1995); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 709.08 (West Supp.
1994). Contra MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 10-7020) (Supp. 1995).
194. SeeJohnson v. Davis, 480 So. 2d 625, 629 (Fla. 1985) (holding that sellers' fraudu-
lent concealment of roof problems entitled buyers to rescission of contract).
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whether to disclose unfavorable information. From a client-counsel-
ing perspective, statutes and case law creating legal rights and reme-
dies for nondisclosure of defective conditions lubricate the slippery
slope by which vendors are converted into guarantors of the condition
of property.
Doctrinally, statutory and common-law causes of action for non-
disclosure require proof of actual personal knowledge of a material
undisclosed defect.1 95 As noted previously, however, seller knowledge
has been allowed to be proven entirely by circumstantial evidence. 96
Courts are being urged to adopt a rule of constructive knowledge that
the seller either knew, or should have known, about the defect before
attempting to sell the property.1 97 Carried to its logical conclusion,
this doctrine may be expected to mutate into an implied warranty by
all sellers of real property.1 98
As a practical matter, the combined impact of judicial decisions
and legislative action has already shifted the burden of structural in-
spection from buyers to sellers. Before exposing property for sale,
sellers are being advised to conduct, at their own expense, profes-
sional prelisting inspections in order to discover faults and defects of
which they were not aware.' 99 Although disclosure statutes do not ex-
pressly require independent property inspections, they do encourage
the practice by relieving sellers of liability for errors or inaccuracies
that are based on reports by home inspectors or other experts.2 °°
While the occasional buyer may be willing to accept a seller's dis-
closure and professional inspection report, most buyers will repeat the
195. W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS §§ 107-110 (5th ed. 1984); see also,
e.g., MICH. COMP. LAws § 565.955 (Supp. 1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5302.30 (Ander-
son Supp. 1994); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 64.06.050 (West Supp. 1995).
196. See supra note 121.
197. Compare Anderson v. Harper, 622 A.2d 319, 323 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (holding that
a seller who repaired a faulty septic system without obtaining required permits could not
assume latent and dangerous condition had been corrected and owed duty to purchasers
to disclose) with Barab v. Plumleigh, 853 P.2d 635, 639 (Idaho CL App. 1993) (holding that
sellers who visited Sun Valley vacation home approximately five times in seven years of
ownership, and used kindling and newspaper to ignite logs in wood stove, were not liable
for failure to disclose defective propane lighter).
198. The trend is proceeding exactly as forecast a decade ago by Chief Justice Boyd of
the Alabama Supreme Court. Johnson v. Davis, 480 So. 2d 625, 631 (Fla. 1985) (Boyd, C.J.,
dissenting).
199. RobertJ. Bruss, How Sellers and Their Agents Can Avoid Lawsuits, Give Buyers Written
Disclosures of All Home Defects and Consider Offering a One-Year Home Warranty, CHi. TRIB., Jan.
19, 1995, at YM5.
200. E.g., MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. §§ 10-702(d) (4), (h)(3) (Supp. 1995).
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process by hiring their own inspectors," 1 who will typically discover
additional defects.2"2 This duplication of effort maximizes the parties'
joint transaction costs, leaving the professional property inspection in-
dustry as the principal, albeit unintended, beneficiary of the erosion
of the doctrine of caveat emptor. °s The home warranty services in-
dustry is another unintended beneficiary of this erosion process. Buy-
ers are being advised to insist that sellers purchase warranties covering
repairs to heating, plumbing, and electrical systems, and roof and
other structural components for the year after closing.20 4 The impor-
tance of these warranties is certainly not downplayed by the brokerage
industry. In the intense competition for listings, one brokerage firm
even promotes "seller's litigation protection," by offering to pay for
home warranty programs.
20 5
The insurance industry is the third unintended beneficiary of the
erosion of the doctrine of caveat emptor. Fear of liability has given
rise to a new insurance product commonly known as "errors and omis-
sions" insurance. 2 0' This type of insurance covers the cost of investi-
201. In addition, most real estate agents recommend that sellers conduct a professional
radon inspection, even if buyers order their own. Charles, supra note 110.
202. Seller disclosure does not replace the need for buyers to conduct property inspec-
tions for several reasons. First, disclosure is limited by the extent of the seller's own knowl-
edge about the condition of the subject property, which may be imperfect. In the absence
of actual personal knowledge, the seller is not liable for any error, omission, or inaccuracy.
Second, some state disclosure statutes limit the scope of liability for negligent disclosure to
defective conditions that are not readily observable. See supra note 191. Third, the seller is
not liable for any error or inaccuracy with respect to information provided by a state or
local governmental agency, or licensed person (e.g., engineer, surveyor, geologist, extermi-
nator) working within an area of expertise. See supra text accompanying note 200. Finally,
the consequences visited upon the seller for violation of the statute may not fully protect
the purchaser. For example, a transfer of property may not be invalidated solely by reason
of failure to comply with required disclosure. CAL. Civ. CODE 1102.13 (West Supp. 1995).
But see OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 5302.30(K) (2) (Anderson Supp. 1994) (expressly granting
rescission).
203. Independent professional inspections occur in nearly 60% of California home
sales, up from less than 20% before enactment of that state's disclosure statute. Linda
Lipman, Inspector's Eye, SAN DIEGO UNIoN-TRIB., Dec. 19, 1993, at HI. See also Home Inspec-
tions Give Home Buyers and Sellers Peace of Mind, Bus. WIRE, May 11, 1994.
204. RobertJ. Bruss, Don't Be in Hurry to Buy As-Is Home, TAMPA TRIB., May 27, 1995, at
H8; H. Jane Lehman, New Insurance Covers Home Sellers; Policies Protect Against Lawsuits, but
Critics Question Worth, WASH. PosT, Jan. 15, 1994, at Fl.
205. See Prudential Voges Realtors Advertisement Tearsheet (on file with author). Ac-
cording to the results of one recent survey, 85% of California real estate agents would
advise sellers to provide a home warranty. Home Warranty Lawsuits: Hoe Warranties Recom-
mended to Provide Protection Against Rising Lawsuits, Bus. WIRE, May 16, 1994.
206. Homeowners Marketing Services, Inc., a Hollywood, Florida-based company, intro-
duced this type of insurance within the past two years and remains its only source. Lor-
raine Mirabella, Disclosure Law Spawns Home Sellers Insurance, BALT. SUN, May 29, 1994, at
KI.
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gating, settling, or defending claims based on inadvertent failure to
disclose defective conditions, and is available only to sellers who list
their property with real estate agents who are themselves insured."°7
A basic policy is offered as part of the package of brokerage services
2 0 8
at no additional cost to sellers, and sellers are encouraged to purchase
expanded coverage at their own expense.209
It is no secret that the real estate sales industry was the principal
intended beneficiary of state disclosure laws.210 The effect of these
"broker protection acts" has been to shield real estate agents from
liability to purchasers for misstatements and omissions by sellers in
complying with their statutory disclosure obligation."' The AIDS is-
sue caught conscientious real estate brokers squarely, and painfully,
on the horns of a profound dilemma: suffer potential liability to
either the purchaser for nondisclosure of an arguably material fact,
212
or to the seller for violation of federal privacy laws against discrimina-
tion based on handicap.
2 1 3
207. Lehman, supra note 204; see also Michael Gisriel, Disclaimer Route Favored by Many
Realty Agents, BALT. SUN, Jan. 29, 1995, at L11.
208. The cost to the broker for the basic $25,000 coverage (subject to a $5,000 deducti-
ble) is $10 to $30 per client. Lehman, supra note 204.
209. For an additional $200 premium payable at closing, sellers may purchase $100,000
of coverage and reduce the deductible to $1,000. Kiplinger's Money Power Laws Beefing Up
After-Sale House Liability, CHARLESTON GAzESrE, Aug. 9, 1994, at D4. According to one esti-
mate, 20% of sellers who are offered the basic package elect to purchase expanded cover-
age. Mirabella, supra note 206.
210. Loughrin v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 161, 164 (Ct. App. 1993) ("The bene-
ficiaries of the [disclosure] statute were individual buyers of real estate and brokers repre-
senting both buyers and sellers."); Bill Lubinger, Disclosure Rule Rings False Alarm, PLAIN
DEALER (Cleveland), June 26, 1994, at El.
211. Some states require, as a condition to absolving brokers from disclosure liability,
that brokers inform sellers of their statutory disclosure obligation. See, e.g., TENN. CODE
ANN. § 66-5-206 (Supp. 1995); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-523 (Michie Supp. 1994).
212. See supra text accompanying notes 160-161 and infra note 215.
213. Federal law prohibits discrimination on the basis of handicap in the sale or rental
of housing. Section 6(a) of the Fair Housing Act makes it unlawful to
discriminate in the sale or rental, or to otherwise make unavailable or deny, a
dwelling to any buyer or renter because of a handicap of (A) that buyer or renter;
(B) a person residing in or intending to reside in that dwelling after it is so sold,
rented, or made available; or (C) any person associated with that buyer or renter.
42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1) (1988). The Fair Housing Act's definition of "handicap" compre-
hends infection with the AIDS virus. 24 C.F.R. § 100.201(a)(2) (1995); see also H.R. REP.
No. 711, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2179. How-
ever, the protections of the Act appear to extend only to discrimination against buyers and
renters, not sellers. Accordingly, it is not at all clear that the Act would prevent disclosure
to prospective purchasers of a previous occupant's medical condition. Paula C. Murray,
AIDS, Ghosts, Murder: Must Real Estate Brokers and Sellers Disclose?, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REv.
689, 701-06 (1992).
Failure to respond to a direct question whether the seller was an AIDS patient remains
problematic. By governmental agency regulation, the state of Washington specifically pro-
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The hysteria surrounding AIDS coincided with the breakdown of
the privity barrier that had once effectively protected brokers from
liability for nondisclosure of information to purchasers in residential
real estate transactions. It was accepted that brokers' fiduciary duty of
loyalty and full disclosure ran only to their seller principals. By the
1980s, however, courts began to acknowledge that real estate brokers,
whose product was entirely information, may be liable for negligent
misrepresentation and fraudulent nondisclosure to buyers.214
This set of circumstances led the real estate brokerage industry to
mobilize itself into action.2" 5 Obligated by the strict fiduciary duty to
subsume their self-interest and act in the best interest of vendors,
members of the industry collectively opted for self-protection. Intense
lobbying in some states by the politically powerful National Associa-
tion of Realtors and state brokers' associations has succeeded in statu-
torily limiting the type of disclosure required by real estate agents.216
This successful lobbying is aptly illustrated when one notes the
timing and legislative history of California's disclosure statute, largely
the result of a 1984 appellate decision imposing liability on a broker
for failing to competently inspect property and disclose its defective
condition to a purchaser. 217 Within a year of this decision, state
lawmakers enacted remedial legislation, sponsored by the California
hibits disclosure of a previous resident's AIDS condition, even in response to a direct ques-
tion. WASHINGTON STATE HuMAN RIGHTS COMM'N, STAFF POLICY GUIDELINES, AIDS AND
REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS (Dec. 1986), cited in Parker, supra note 72, at 26 n.37.
214. Kings Motor Oils, Inc. v. Aviation Petroleum, Inc., No. 91 C 8028, 1993 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 8257, at *12 (N.D. Ill. June 16, 1993); Easton v. Strassburger, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383,
387-91 (Ct. App. 1984).
215. The industry obtained relief in various forms. On May 9, 1990, the General Coun-
sel of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), Frank Keating, re-
sponding to an inquiry from the National Association of Realtors, opined that "unsolicited
statements made by a real estate broker or agent that a current or previous occupant of the
property has AIDS would violate [the Federal Fair Housing Act]. A broker's unsolicited
statements to a prospective buyer or renter would indicate a discriminatory preference or
limitation based on handicap." Robert D. Butters, HUD Says AIDS Disclosure Can Violate Title
VIII, 1 FOR THE RECORD (National Ass'n of Realtors, Chicago, Ill.), Fall 1990, at 2 (quoting
Frank Keating, General Counsel, HUD). An interpretation of state statutory or common
law that an occupant's AIDS condition was a material fact imposing an affirmative duty on
brokers to investigate and disclose would likely be preempted by federal law. Id. Mr. Keat-
ing further advised that, if asked about an occupant's AIDS condition, brokers should de-
cline to respond. Id.
216. Murray, supra note 141, at 65; Bradley Inman, New Laws to Forestall Loan Fraud, SAN
DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Oct. 9, 1994, at H13.
217. Easton, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 383. In Easton, a portion of the house was built on fill dirt
that had not been properly engineered and compacted. Id. at 385. Landslides caused by
massive earth movement destroyed a portion of the driveway shortly after closing, and wall
cracks and warped doorways resulted from subsequent settling. Id. The estimated cost to
repair and stabilize the property exceeded its purchase price. Id.
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Association of Realtors,"' that clarified the type of inspection brokers
would be expected to conduct.2" 9 The following year the legislature
enacted a second bill requiring sellers to complete a detailed disclo-
sure statement.
220
Viewed in-the most favorable light possible, state disclosure stat-
utes represent a long overdue attempt by the real estate brokerage
industry and the bar to reconcile the divergent perspectives on the
land conveyancing process held by members of their respective pro-
fessions. Attorneys have always considered contract formation to be
the decisive event in real estate transactions, with the contract of sale
being the critical document. Brokers, on the other hand, have long
infuriated real estate lawyers by encouraging the parties to execute a
contract prior to seeking legal representation, leaving clients to arrive
in the law office already contractually bound.
To some extent, the brokers' attitude reflects a sinister desire to
keep parties and lawyers apart. In the brokers' traditional worldview,
premature consultation with lawyers will, at best, interfere with the
sales momentum and delay contract formation. At worst, an attorney
is likely to kill the deal by unnecessarily directing the parties' attention
to the remote contingencies (for example, risk of loss from fire or
other casualty) that attorneys, by their training, feel compelled to
221raise.
It is ironic, therefore, that attorneys may be disclosure statutes'
final, and least intended, beneficiaries. Broker involvement in com-
plying with statutory disclosure would defeat its principal purpose by
exposing them to liability for omissions, inaccuracies, and misstate-
ments. In states where disclosure forms provide for seller indemnity
against broker liability,22 it would be a conflict of interest for brokers
218. Loughrin v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 161, 164 (Ct. App. 1993).
219. The scope of investigation excluded matters "reasonably and normally inaccessible
to such an inspection." CAL. CIv. CODE § 2079.3 (West Supp. 1995).
220. Id. §§ 1102-1102.15.
221. In this author's opinion, there is also a more charitable explanation: Real estate
brokers and lawyers have tended to view the purpose of the real estate contract of sale very
differently. To attorneys, a contract represents the consummation of a long process of
negotiation and transfer of essential information about the parties and the property. In
other words, once the parties have a contract, they have a deal. To brokers, a contract
reflects merely a psychological commitment to undertake the often long and tedious pro-
cess of back-and-forth renegotiation of the deal as information becomes available to the
buyer during the executory period. In other words, once the parties have a contract, they
are poised to begin to make a deal.
222. See, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 89-1-509 (Supp. 1995).
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to participate in the disclosure process.223 Furthermore, listing agents
are advised not to assist sellers in completing disclosure forms, so most
sellers will experience a vague sense of abandonment at an important
stage in the process.22 '4 Additionally, the standardized forms warn that
their completion subjects sellers to legal consequences.2 25 As a result
of these developments, at least some sellers will likely feel the need to
fill the "counseling vacuum" by consulting with attorneys for assist-
ance in complying with disclosure obligations.2 2 6
Disclosure statutes, like statutes of frauds before them, thus offer
the potential for serving the important channelling function of di-
recting sellers to sources of legal advice at a meaningful time in the
transaction process.227 If they encourage sellers to consult attorneys,
the statutes will inadvertently accomplish the preventive law objective
of uncovering points of disagreement, ambiguities, mistakes, and
omissions of detail, which may then be corrected prior to contract
execution.2 28 By focusing the parties' attention on the significant
legal issues involved in the contract formation phase of the land con-
veyancing process, and by placing the transfer of information up-front
where it can be a factor in negotiating the purchase price, disclosure
statutes may avoid the kind of nasty surprises that lead to disputes
both before and after the closing of real estate transactions.
CONCLUSION
The doctrine of caveat emptor in the sale of real property has
given way to a societal expectation that sellers disclose material infor-
mation that cannot reasonably be acquired by buyers without signifi-
cant investment. This policy serves the remedial purpose of
enlightening purchasers laboring under serious misapprehension so
they may rationally assess the true level of risk involved in the bargain.
Nevertheless, a practice is evolving by which sellers are expected to
incur costs to generate information for the purpose of disclosure.
223. See Harris Ominsky, How to Handle Residential Real Estate Disclosure, 10 PRAC. REAL
Esr. LAw. 65, 67-68 (May 1994).
224. Hal Porter, New Disclosure Laws for Home Sellers, HOME MECHANIX, Mar. 1994, at 28.
225. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 765, para. 77/35 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1995); MICH.
ComP. LAws § 565.957 (Supp. 1995). Standardized forms in some states specifically suggest
that seller may wish to consult with a lawyer in connection with the disclosure process. See,
e.g., CAL.. CiV. CODE § 1102.6 (West Supp. 1995); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 765, para. 77/35
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1995).
226. Deborah L. Wood, Sellers Must Reveal Troubles-Or Else; Law Protects Buyers from
Known Defects, CHI. SuN-TIMES, Oct. 9, 1994, at 3.
227. Joseph M. Perillo, The Statute of Frauds in the Light of the Functions and Dysfunctions of
Form, 43 Fo.DHAm L. REv. 39, 57-58 (1974).
228. Id. at 57.
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Approximately half the states have recently enacted mandatory
information-disclosure statutes. 229 These statutes, ostensibly designed
to enhance the information available to purchasers, in fact represent a
legislative reaction, inspired by the real estate brokerage industry, to
the uncontrolled erosion of the doctrine of caveat emptor by com-
mon-law development.
Economic efficiency dictates that transaction costs of the land
conveyancing process be limited. The first generation of state disclo-
sure statutes violates this principle. These statutes encourage the pro-
duction of unnecessary and duplicative information, exacerbating the
already costly burden of real estate settlement.230 In the aggregate, it
may be less costly for society as a whole simply to absorb the loss
caused by allowing occasional unintentional misrepresentation to
231
continue.
Fortunately, there is an alternative. In an interesting variation,
three states have embraced a market-driven approach. 232 Sellers of
residential real property in Maryland, Oregon, and Virginia are of-
fered an option: A seller may elect to furnish either a statement
describing known latent defects or a disclaimer informing the pro-
spective purchaser that the seller is making no representations or war-
ranties, and is selling the property "as is" with all existing defects.23 3 It
remains to be seen whether a seller's decision to disclose or disclaim
will affect marketability. 23 4 Presumably, absent a sufficient explana-
229. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
230. Brokers, loan officers, appraisers, tide assurance personnel, surveyors, and escrow
agents must all be compensated for their participation in the land conveyancing process.
As a result, total settlement costs average 10% of contract sales price. PAUL GOLDSTEIN &
GERALD KORNOLD, REAL ESTATE TRANSACrONS 12 (3d ed. 1993). Each incremental in-
crease effectively prices some buyers out of the market, and forces others to seek lower
priced housing that is less suited to the needs of their household. Id. at 13.
231. By following the advice they receive to obtain a pre-listing structural inspection,
radon test, warranty, and errors and omissions insurance in order to safely comply with
their statutory disclosure obligations, risk-averse sellers will incur additional transaction
costs of about $1200. See supra notes 199-209 and accompanying text. According to a re-
cent estimate by the National Association of Realtors, 3.5 million previously owned single
family homes are sold annually. Used-Home Sales Sag to Hit a 2-Year Low, ORLANDO SENTINEL,
Mar. 28, 1995, at B1. If the brokerage industry succeeds in its nationwide lobbying efforts,
statutory disclosure carries a potential price tag of $4.2 billion on the basis of the above
estimates.
232. MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 10-702 (Supp. 1995); OR. REv. STAT. ANN.
§§ 105.465-.490 (Supp. 1994); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-517 to -525 (Michie Supp. 1994).
233. MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 10-702(b)(1) (Supp. 1995); OR. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 105.465(2) (Supp. 1994); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-519 (Michie Supp. 1994).
234. Given the choice between disclosing or disclaiming, one-fourth of sellers doing
business at one Maryland realty company were opting to give the disclaimer during the
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tion, buyers will be suspicious of property offered for sale without
disclosure.
The Maryland, Oregon, and Virginia statutes provide a model for
second generation disclosure statutes consistent with voluntary poli-
cies recently adopted in other English-speaking jurisdictions.235 To
the extent other states follow this example, the legacy of the statutory
disclosure experiment will have been the revival of the doctrine of
caveat emptor-with a twist. Sellers interested in purchase price max-
imization may elect to incur the additional expense of generating and
disclosing relevant information. Or, sellers will be required to inform
all buyers what sophisticated purchasers knew all along: There is in-
formation about this property that you do not know; you should as-
sume the worst, and govern yourself accordingly in contract
negotiations. In other words, buyer beware.
new statute's first few months of operation. Adriane B. Miller, Disclosure Law Mystifies Mar-
ket, BALT. SUN, May 1, 1994, at Li.
235. See supra notes 78-80, 85-87 and accompanying text.
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